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I. INTRODUCTION 
T he question of what remedies should be available to a mortgageel upon default of the mortgagor makes mortgage law unique, diffi-
cult, and important. If all mortgagors paid their debts or if all mortga-
gees were free to take any action their documents permitted, there 
would be neither a foreclosure process nor any restrictions placed upon 
it by courts or legislatures. Mortgage documents would be less than a 
page long, freedom of contract would prevail, and society would have 
little need for mortgage lawyers. 
Mortgage law, however, is complicated by the competing interests 
of mortgagees, one the one hand, who want their documents to provide 
effective relief in cases of default, and judges and legislators, on the 
other hand, who do not want mortgagees strictly enforcing their con-
I. In this article I use "mortgagee" and "mortgagor," in contrast to "secured creditor" and 
"debtor" as used by the Uniform Land Security Interest Act (ULSIA), because the bJr is gener-
ally accustomed to those terms-even in jurisdictions utilizing deeds of trust rather than mort-
gages-and because such traditional vocabulary may make the substanee of the new Act easier to 
grasp on first reading. Because terms such as "lender" and "borrower" are not likely 10 con ruse 
too much, I occasionally employ them without intending any significancc-olher than relier rrom 
monotony thereby. 
I also employ the following conventions regarding pronouns: The mortgagee is "it" (an insti-
tutionallender); any junior mortgagee is "she"; the mortgagor is "he"; and finally, a tenant on the 
mortgaged property is also referred to as "she" whenever this will nOI cause conrusion. 
': . 
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tracted-for rights after their mortgagors have defa,ulted. Most' of the 
substantive law of mortgages thus consists of rules restricting the reme-
dies that mortgagees have written for themselves in their mortgages. 
It is therefore hardly surprising that the motivation behind the 
Uniform Land Security Interest Act (ULSIA or Act) is the improve-
ment of the collection process in cases of default; indeed, most of the 
text and commentary of the Act deals with that topic.2 The Uniform 
Law Commissioners' Introduction makes a token bow to other advan-
tages of uniformity, but gets to the real point when it complains that 
"delays in completing real estate foreclosures . . . have increased the 
risks of vandalism, fire loss, depreciation, damages and waste ... [and] 
plainly raised the cost of private mortgages, and have significantly 
eroded the economic value of many government subsidy programs in-
volving real estate mortgages."3 To correct these shortcomings, the 
Commissioners believe that "the availability of a uniform, less expen-
sive, and more expeditious foreclosure procedure would ameliorate 
these conditions and would facilitate the sale and resale of secured real 
estate loans."4 What ULSIA is all about is an improved foreclosure 
process; states considering its enactment should judge it in this context. 
The arsenal of protections that the judiciary and legislatures have 
developed to protect mortgagors in distress has plainly irritated the 
lending industry. Starting five hundred years ago, from the Chancel-
lor's original refusal to let a mortgage deed operate according to its 
terms by giving the mortgagee a fee simple absolute automatically and 
immediately upon default, and running through the equity of redemp-
tion, the delays of foreclosure, the replacement of strict foreclosure by 
sale foreclosure, post-sale redemption, deficiency judgment limitations 
and moratoria, up to mandatory restructuring today, a mortgagee gen-
erally dreads enforcing its remedies on .default. The prospect of taking 
the pound of flesh without shedding a drop of blood is too risky. Be-
cause these impediments are treated as "superior equities" of the mort-
2. There are more code sections in part 5 (Default) than in any other part of ULSIA. and the 
number of pages that part occupies in the Official Pamphlet exceeds those of any other part. 
I have not begun thi5 Article with an explanation of the history of ULSIA or a general 
review of its contents, since those matters are covered elsewhere in this issue. Only with regard to 
the substantive rules in the Act actually covered in this Article are its provisions described. ana-
lyzed, and sometimes quoted. 
3. STUDY COMMIITEE OF THE CONNECTICUT LAW REVISION COMMISSION. UNIFORM LAND 
SECURITY INTEREST ACT AND CONNECTICUT MORTGAGE AND FORECLOSURE LAW: A COMI'AIU-
SON, ULSIA Prefatory Note (Materials for the Mortgage and Foreclosure Law 1991) (forthcom-
ing 1992). 
4. [d. 
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gagor, they can rarely be waived by improved language in the docu-
ments; indeed, nonwaivability of protection!! becomes the main 
protective rule in mortgage transactions. Betterment, therefore, must 
come not from forcing mortgagors to agree to more onerous terms, but 
from appealing to the rulemakers to soften the rules. 
This Act is one such appeal. There may be some perceived advan-
tages to uniformity, but the real motive behind ULSIA is to quicken 
and cheapen the foreclosure process.s Special protections are granted to 
one class of borrowers-"protected parties"7-but in return the entire 
collection process is intended to be simpler, faster, cheaper, and more 
effective in all other respects. Speedy power-of-sale foreclosure is to re-
place inefficient judicial foreclosure, and self-help mortgagee in posses-
sion status is to replace judicial receivership to capture rental income 
from the property prior to foreclosure. In return for giving protected 
parties expanded redemption rights and extensive immunity from defi-
ciency liability, other mortgagors will have fewer cushions after default 
than many jurisdictions now provide. This is the trade-off offered by 
ULSIA. 
Overall, the strategy has had some success. ULSIA has the bless-
ings of the American College of Real Estate Lawyers8 and the Real 
Property Section of the American Bar Association.s However, though it 
was first promulgated in 1985, the Act has not yet been adopted in any 
jurisdiction, nor has it received much consideration in the law reviews 
or trade journals.lO As a result, state legislatures do not have much 
5. Standard adages in this regard abound, e.g., "Once a mortgage always a mortgage." "No 
clogging the equity of redemption," "Necessitous debtors are not truly freemen," etc. 
6. This point is candidly acknowledged by the Commissioners: "This Act is b3Scd on a major 
policy decision-to reduce the 'cost' of foreclosure." ULSlA § 503 cmt. I (1985). 
7. Id. § 503(e); see a/so discussion infra part VIII.D. 
8. The American College of Real Estate Lawyers (ACREL) Committee on Law Reform rec-
ommended that ACREL support the adoption of ULSIA nationally. See AMERICAN COllEGE OF 
REAL EsTATE LAWYERS, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON LAw REFORM OS TIlE U:'1fORM LASD 
SECURITY INTEREST ACT ("ULSIA") 18 (undated) [hereinafter ACREL REPORT]. 
9. The Act was drafted by a Joint Editorial Board composed of representatives of the Ameri-
can Bar Association (ABA) and ACREL, along with the Commissioners. 
10. Most of ULSIA was copied from the ill-fated Uniform Land Transactions Act (ULTA), 
promulgated ten years earlier in 1975, of which Article 3 covered mortgages. On the assumption 
that ULTA failed because it was too comprehensive, the section on mortgages was pulled out and 
recast as ULSIA. 
However, ULTA itself did not receive much critical consideration in the literature, although 
a few summaries of that Act were written. See, e.g., James E. Murray, The Proposed Uniform 
Land Transactions Act, 7 REAL EsT. REV. 64 (1977-78); James M. Pedo\\itz, Mortgage Fareclo-
sure Under the Uniform Land Transactions Act (As Amended), 6 REAL EsT U 179 (1977-78). 
See a/so Robert Kratovil, The Uniform Land Transactions Act: A First Laok. 49 ST JOHS'S L 
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existing analysis to aid them. 
This Article attempts to serve that critical function. I approached 
ULSIA from the point of view of a mortgagee confronted with a de-
fault by its mortgagor who intended to collect its debt by complying 
with ULSIA. I proceeded mentally through the steps the lender would 
have to take at each stage of the process, noting where the Act gave 
clear guidance to the parties and where its message was silent, unclear, 
ambiguous, or contradictory.ll Overall, I found that ULSIA did not 
present an easy road map to follow. 
II. DEFAULT 
Normally, prefacing an analysis of remedies on default with a dis-
cussion of the meaning of the term "default" would not be re-
quired-that being the sort of dry, semantic issue that is usually of 
interest only to nonpractitioners. ULSIA, however, compels such an ef-
fort by putting a special twist on the word. The Commissioners' com-
ment to section 501 states: 
The rights and remedies in this Part are dependent on a "de-
fault." This term is not defined in this Act: a "default" is the 
failure of the debtor to perform an obligation which the secur-
ity agreement provides is to be regarded as a "default."12 If 
this event has occurred, the remedies of this Part become 
REV. 460 (1974-75) (omitting to cover Article 3 on mortgages, however). 
There were also some articles comparing ULTA to existing state mortgage law. See, e.g., 
Symposium, The Uniform Land Transactions Act and the Uniform Simplification of Land Trans-
fers Act: Potential Impact on Florida Law, 10 STETSON L. REV. 21 (1980-81); Patricia E. Rant, 
Comment, ULTA and Nonjudicial Mortgage Foreclosure in Texas, 12 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1104 
(1980-81). But none of these undertook to appraise how the Act functioned. The closest there was 
to general critical commentary on ULTA was Jon W. Bruce, Mortgage Law Reform Vllder the 
Uniform Land Transactions Act, 64 GEO. L.J. 1245 (1975-76). There was specific criticism of 
ULTA's rents and profits rules. See, e.g., Patrick A. Randolph, The Mortgagee's Interest ill 
Rellts: Some Policy Considerations and Proposals, 29 KAN. L. REV. 1 (1980). The subject of 
rents and profits is covered later in this Article. See discussion infra part XI. 
11. Thus, the organization of this paper attempts to track the steps in an ordinary collection 
proceeding. Obviously, I could not cover actions on the security and actions on the debt simultane-
ously in the same fashion as they might occur in the real world. Additionally, the usual intermedi-
ate step of having a receiver collect the rents during the foreclosure process has been postponed to 
the end of the Article due to its conceptually special nature. See discussion infra parts XI.B.-
XI.C. 
12. ULSIA § 501 cmt. 2 (emphasis added). The provision is intentional. The Commissioners' 
comment goes on to give as an example "an amortized secured loan calling for payments on the 
first of each month alld prOViding that nonpayment is a default." Id. (emphasis added). 
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available. IS 
Customarily, the concept of default involves nonperformance of a 
duty; there is no additional requirement that the documents also label 
the situation as a default. Mortgage documents include numerous obli-
gations to be performed (e.g., payment of the note, payment of taxes or 
insurance, care of the property), but assume rather than define their 
nonperformance as defaults. Under ULSIA, as interpreted by its draft-
ers, such an assumption might be unwarranted. If nonpayment of an 
installment is a default only if the agreement specifies that it is a de-
fault, then it may be something else where the agreement does not so 
specify-a form of remediless breach. 
It is difficult to believe, however, that courts would deny a mortga-
gee the right to foreclose on a mortgagor who has not paid his note 
merely because its mortgage did not include a provision that nonpay-
ment was to be regarded as a default. The Commissioners' rationale 
was to separate nonperformance from default in order to clarify various 
time periods prescribed in the Act governing foreclosure proceedings. 
Thus they say: 
The minimum time is not stated as a minimum period after 
default but as a minimum period after an event specified in 
the statute .... By using non-payment as the point of begin-
ning of time which must elapse rather than default, the Act 
does not penalize the lender who expresses a grace period in 
his security agreement or who takes informal action to have 
the non-payment cured before he determines to proceed to 
forec1ose.14 
However, there are easier ways to accomplish that result. Clocks can be 
set to start either on the mortgagor's nonperformance or on the mort-
gagee's election to act because of the previous nonperformance (and 
with or without grace period considerations) without requiring the se-
curity agreement to specify which event is the "default."lG 
If ULSIA is enacted, lenders would be well advised to redraft 
13. Id. 
14. Id . 
. 15. Certainly, good arguments can be made that "default" should retain its normal meaning, 
even under ULSIA. The Commissioners' comment is not part of the official text of the Act. That 
text provides merely that "[i]f a debtor is in default under a security agreement, the secured 
creditor has the rights and remedies provided in this Part," and does not include "default" in its 
definitional sections. See id. § 501(a). 
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their documents to guard against this risk. As a general precaution, 
there should be a provision in the security agreement to the effect that 
nonperformance of any obligation included in the security agreement 
(or in any other documents executed or given by the debtor as part of 
the transaction) is to be considered a default.16 More cautious drafting 
would add a clause to the statement of each individual obligation (in 
each document included in the loan package) providing that nonper-
formance equals default.17 
III. ACCELERATION OF THE DEBT 
If the obligation involved is an installment one, the first step a 
mortgagee is expected to take upon default of the mortgagor is to ac-
celerate the future payments into a present lump sum obligation. 
Under ULSIA, that occurs by the giving of a "notice of 
acceleration."18 
A. The Notice of Acceleration 
Section 502(a) provides that 
[t]o exercise a right to accelerate against a debtor, a creditor 
must give written notice after the debtor's failure to perform 
that if the failure is not cured before a date stated, which may 
not be earlier than 15 days after the date the notice is given 
. . . the entire debt will be due.19 
A fifteen-day grace period is thus created. Nonprotected parties are 
permitted to waive this protection,20 although it is unclear as to 
16. The FNMA/FHLMC Uniform Note provides: "If I do not pay the full amount of each 
monthly payment on the date it is due, I will be in default." Multistate Fixed Rate Note-Single 
Family-FNMA/FHLMC Uniform Instrument Form 3200 12/83, reprinted in D. BARLOW 
BURKE. JR .. LAW OF FEDERAL MORTGAGE DOCUMENTS app. D. at 480 (1989). Such a provision 
should satisfy the ULSIA standard for nonpayment; however, there is no similar provision in the 
Note or in the Uniform Mortgage covering other forms of nonperformance. 
17. To avoid having to deal with this issue in other parts of this Article, I assume from here 
after that the mortgagor has committed a "default" as specified in the mortgage documents. 
18. ULSIA § 502(a). Other choices and, possibly, notices must also be given in conjunction 
with the collection of rents, but those considerations do not interact directly with the notices and 
choices involved under § 502(a). Thus, those considerations are discussed infra, part XI.B.1. 
19. Id. The Act assumes that the holder of an installment obligation has a valid acceleration 
clause in its note rather than creating a statutory right to accelerate even without a clause. The 
formal requirement of such a clause in the loan papers would have been better located in § 502, 
dealing with acceleration, rather than in § 513, covering de-acceleration. 
20. Id. § 502(a). In this respect, this provision operates differently from most of the other 
protected-party provisions of ULSIA, which provide that the protected party is covered and other 
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whether the permission to waive applies to the right to receive any no-
tice whatsoever or only to the fifteen-day grace.21 
Section 502(a) provides for an unconventional grace period. The 
mortgagee is not held inactive for the first fifteen days after an install-
ment has been missed. Rather, the mortgagee is permitted to take ac-
. tion immediately by way of written warning of pending acceleration if 
a cure is not made within the next fifteen days or longer. Because the 
fifteen days starts from the date of notice, not of nonpayment, a delay 
of-for instance-five days in giving notice creates an extended 
(twenty-day) grace period.22 Furthermore, if the mortgage provides for 
an even longer grace period, this extension prevails over the fifteen-day 
period.23 
1. Failure to Send the Notice 
ULSIA does not treat the effect of failure to send a notice of ac-
celeration. Collection remedies are then presumably confined to arrear-
ages rather than to the remaining unpaid balance of the note. This re-
sult might be precisely what the mortgagee desires. Indeed, where there 
is no prepayment penalty in the note or where the penalty does not 
apply to involuntary acceleration and the debtor is solvent, a suit for 
the missed installments may be the best course of action. The notice is 
not a prerequisite to any affirmative relief the mortgagee seeks, and a 
lender may start either foreclosure proceedings or an action on the note 
parties are not covered. This grace period is initially available to all p3rties and becomes inappli-
cable to non protected borrowers only if they expressly waive it. This arrangement makes it some-
what more likely that the non protected party mortgagor will realize that his notice rights are 
being waived by language in the documents, and perhaps even be able to rorgain oyer that 
feature. 
In general, protected party transactions are covered in a separate article in this symposium 
issue. See Curtis J. Berger, ULSIA and the Protected Party: E\·olution or Rn·olution? 24 CO~"N. 
L. REv. 971 (1992). 
21. It is most unlikely that a party who is one day late will realize that his entire debt has 
been accelerated if he has not been informed of that fact. 
22. In other situations, ULSIA uses the date of the underlying event as the clock-trigger, see 
ULSIA § 501 cmt. 2, rather than the date when notice was sent. The purpose of using the former 
date was to permit the creditor to be cooperative without simultaneously wahing its rights. No 
reason is stated as to why that policy was rejected in this situation. In light of the importance 
acceleration has towards making the other remedies usable, the statutory scheme forces the mort-
gagee to give prompt notice of acceleration (while it negotiates), although it is able to defer the 
sending of other notices without harming its position. 
23. See ULSIA § 502(a). The notice of acceleration must still be given, but the time p~riod is 
prolonged. 
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without having given any notice of acceleration first. 24 The Commis-
sioners assume that the notice of acceleration will precede any foreclo-
sure notice,211 but they have not mandated that this order of procedure 
be followed. 
2. Unanswered Issues 
a. Who Receives the Notice? 
ULSIA does not cover the question of who is to receive notice of 
acceleration. Junior creditors and other interested parties do not appear 
entitled to it. Section 502(a) provides only that the creditor "must give 
written notice" and that it may be waived by "a debtor other than a 
protected party," omitting any mention of juniors, guarantors or te-
nants.26 Nor do the sections that impose duties to notify these other 
interested parties as to other matters27 refer to an acceleration notice. 
Non-notice of acceleration may have been regarded by the Com-
missioners as consistent with the statutory system, since none of these 
other parties have any right to undo an accelerated obligation. How-
ever, their inability to avoid acceleration once it has occurred is in fact 
an argument in support of enabling them to receive notice as early as 
possible; if they have only fifteen days to avoid an acceleration, they 
should be made aware of that immediately. Treating acceleration as an 
irrelevant matter to a junior creditor seriously prejudices her. A seller 
who has taken back a second mortgage frequently lacks the where-
withal to pay the entire first mortgage when it goes into default or to 
bid at the senior foreclosure sale. Her only hope may be to stave off the 
senior foreclosure by keeping it current while she forecloses on her own 
mortgage and resells the property. To do so, she must be able to keep 
the senior loan current on an installment basis, which may be impossi-
24. This would occur when a single payment note was involved. 
25. Section 508(b) provides that the notice of intention to foreclose must state whether the 
debt has been accelerated and does not provide for incorporating the notice of acceleration into it. 
Because the notice of intention is permitted to include other required notices-as an alternative to 
sending them separately, see id. § 508(b)(10)-not mentioning the notice of acceleration suggests 
that such inclusion is not permitted here. In light of the fact that foreclosure may be implicitly 
delayed 15 days in these cases, as discussed below, see infra parts IV.C., V.A., that exclusion may 
have been intentional. 
26. ULSIA § 502(a). Furthermore, comment 1 to this section refers to it as "basic notice 
protection for a debtor." The ACREL Committee concluded that there is no such notice require-
ment to nonprotected parties. See ACREL REPORT, supra note 8, at II. 
27. See, e.g., ULSIA §§ 507(0, 509(a). 
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ble, given the statutory absence of notice to her.28 
b. What Should the Notice Say? 
With regard to the contents of the notice of acceleration, ULSIA 
seems to require only that it include a date after which acceleration 
will occur if a cure has not been made.28 ULSIA is silent as to whether 
more information may be included. Lenders must decide whether to 
have the notice state that late or prepayment penalties are also imposed 
or whether other defaults besides the last missed payment must also be 
cured within the time allotted.30 There is no statutory form of notice of 
acceleration, meaning that lenders must await judicial construction or 
statutory amendment before they can be sure how best to draft this 
document. 
3. Relationship to Other Provisions 
a. Prepayment Charges 
The Act is intentionally cautious on the question of prepayment 
penalties after an acceleration for default. A prohibition against such 
charges is included as an optional provision in ULSIA.31 The Commis-
sioners were concerned about distinguishing between "deliberate" de-
faults (done to trigger an acceleration) and other defaults, and conse-
quently elected to leave its adoption to the states "after careful 
consideration of the opportunities for its abuse in avoiding valid pre-
payment charges."32 This is an odd point to leave to local option, since 
the sensitive nature of the issue justifies the utilization of expert analy-
sis and nationally consistent treatment-the very reasons why a uni-
form act might be promulgated and adopted. 
The Commissioners also suggest that if the optional prohibition is 
adopted, it might be limited to protected parties, thereby validating in-
28. ULSIA is also silent on the question of how the notice of ac:celerotion should be 
sent-mail is the preferred method for other statutory notices. See. e.g .• id. §§ SOS(a). S09(a). 
Moreover, there is no provision for recordation or publication of any notice. 
29. Id. § 502(a). Section l12(f) requires that all notices sent to protected p:!rties must recite 
(sometimes in other languages) .. 'This is an important notice regarding your rights in real estate. 
Get it translated immediately.' .. 
30. There is no reason to believe that a notice of ac:celerotion becomes invalid if it contains 
such additional warnings and there is always the risk that noninclusion of these items might be 
deemed to constitute a waiver of any rights involved. Thus, an Cltp:!nded notice of ac:celerotion 
seems warranted. 
31. See id. § 502(b). 
32. ld. § 502 cmt. 2. 
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voluntary prepayment penalty charges imposed on commercial 
mortgagors.33 
b. La~e Charges 
Nothing in section 502 requires the notice or act of acceleration to 
make any reference to the imposition of a late charge. A later section 
requires the debtor to pay "any other obligation" owed as a condition 
of undoing acceleration,34 and a comment to that section indicates that 
the Commissioners intended it to refer to late charges.311 As written, 
late charge penalties may be imposed independently of any grace pe-
riod for acceleration (Le., before the notice of acceleration is first sent, 
or during the fifteen-day waiting period, if the promissory note so pro-
vides), pursuant to the Commissioners' committment to freedom of 
contract wherever possible.36 
The Commissioners have not shown the same deference to local 
option on this issue as was given to prepayment charges. In those states 
which have statutory or judicial restrictions on late charges, separate 
consideration will be required to determine how those limitations are to 
survive ULSIA and what modifications to this Act are therefore 
required. 
B. De-acceleration 
The debtor's right to de-accelerate37-or undo the acceleration-is 
available only to a protected party mortgagor and not to any other in-
terested party.3S As to parties other than a protected party, the right to 
"cure" or "redeem"39 is limited to payment of the entire (accelerated) 
33. Id. The prohibition against a prepayment penalty after acceleration was disliked by the 
ACREL Committee, which proposed that it be deleted. See ACREL REPORT, supra note 8, at 
11. 
34. Id. § SI3(b)(2); see also id. § 402(a)(S) (allowing a creditor to receive the lesser of five 
dollars or five percent of the unpaid balance in addition to finance charges allowed under § 403 
after a default). 
3S. Id. § S13 cmt. 2. 
36. Id. § SOl cmt. 3. 
37. In this Article, I use the term "de-acceleration" to refer to a debtor's curing of the default 
by paying only the arrearages (missed installments) rather than the entire unpaid balance of the 
debt. This is often referred to as a right of reinstatement as distinct from the right of redemption. 
ULSIA does not employ such a word but instead uses the phrase "avoid operation of any accelera-
tion clause ... in the security agreement." Id. § S13(b). Several references in that section to an 
acceleration clause should be taken to refer to a notice of acceleration instead. 
38. Id. § SI3(b). 
39. Section S13 refers to a right to "cure default and redeem" but does not explain any differ-
ence intended between curing and redeeming. Neither term is defined in § 111. Section Sl3 uses 
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debt after the notice of acceleration has taken effect. 
For a protected party to de-accelerate his obligation, section 
513(b) requires that he not only pay the arrearages, but also "per-
form[] any other obligation the protected party would have been bound 
to perform in the absence of any acceleration clause."4o This would 
cover tax and insurance payments. A comment to the section seems to 
indicate that it also refers to late charges.41 Additionally, the protected 
party must pay foreclosure expenses, "including reasonable attorney's 
fees" if a notice of intention to foreclose was given.4:! 
There are some limitations on the right to de-accelerate. It may be 
exercised only once a year.43 Furthermore, although it is transferable 
by the mortgagor,44 a transferee who proposes to de-accelerate may be 
required by the mortgagee to give "adequate assurance of due perform-
ance if the [mortgagee] in good faith believes that the prospect of fur-
ther payment or performance would be impaired."4G 
All other parties-unprotected debtors, junior creditors, tenants, 
etc.-have a right to de-accelerate an installment obligation, provided 
they act prior to the date when the notice of acceleration takes effect. 
As pointed out previously, even this action is made difficult for them by 
"cure" as the operative word in subsections (a), (b) and (c) (and some of the comments), but then 
switches in subsections (d) and (e) to "cure or redeem" without explanation. It is not uncommon 
to use different words to distinguish between the right to pay the debt \\ith and without accelera-
tion, but that does not seem to be the distinction intended in ULSIA. 
40. Id. § 513(b)(2). 
41. See Id. § 513 cmt. 2. 
42. Id. § 513(b)(3). Because the implication is that attorney's fees are not recoverable unless 
the notice of intention to foreclose was given, this will probably lead to the gi\'ing of both accelera-
tion and foreclosure notices together. Although unstated, there is probably also a requirement that 
an attorney's fees clause be included in the note before they will be awarded. 
43. Id. § 513(c). This section refers to a protected party having cured after ha\ing "received a 
notice of acceleration," which would prohibit a second cure even if the first one was made during 
the grace period and before acceleration had finally set in (as far as all other parties were con-
cerned). This might create a greater incentive by the mortgagee to send notices of acceleration as 
quickly as possible to troublesome borrowers. 
44. Id. § 513(d). A reference to § 208 makes the transfer subject to due-on-sale restrictions. 
however. Thus a mortgagor in default who is attempting to "protect his 'equity' " by selling it to 
another, see id. § 513 cmt. 3, may be able to transfer the right to redeem but not the right to de-
accelerate. 
45. Id. § 513(d). The requirement quoted in the paragraph would apply only where a "pro-
tected party other than a protected party who defaulted proposes to cure." Id. However, comment 
3 refers to this person as "the assignee of a protected party." Id. § 513 cmt. 3. There is no 
apparent reason why the section itself uses such an awkward and unnecessary phrase if that is all 
that was meant. 
There is also a reference in the section to releasing the right to redeem. This is discussed in 
the section on deeds in lieu of foreclosure. See discussion infra part IX. 
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the failure of the Act to require that they receive such notice. ULSIA 
offers no justification for the limitation of the right to de-accelerate to 
the mortgagor, either in terms of how de-acceleration by other parties 
would inconvenience the senior mortgagee or how juniors and others 
are to adequately protect themselves without this remedy.48 
IV. MONEY ACTIONS 
Section 501 (a) states that a mortgagee's rights include "the right 
to reduce the personal obligation of the secured creditor's claim to 
judgment." The right to seek monetary relief in lieu of or in addition to 
foreclosing on the collateral is expressly reserved to the secured credi-
tor, whether or not it is mentioned in the loan documents.47 
A. Choice of Remedies 
In their comments to section 501, the Commissioners announce 
that they have rejected the one-action rule followed in several western 
states.48 That rule not only limits a mortgagee to one lawsuit, it also 
confines that lawsuit to a foreclosure action, thereby prohibiting a suit 
on the note even when the creditor is willing to waive its security en-
tirely and sue only on the note.49 The one-action rule is, therefore, both 
a security-first rule and a single-action rule. ULSIA rejects both as-
pects of the rule by authorizing the mortgagee to seek multiple relief 
simultaneously and by not requiring the mortgagee to exhaust the se-
curity first:50 The Act is silent on the right of the mortgagee to bring a 
46. There seems to be no statutory obstacle to a nonmortgagor tendering the arrearages to the 
accelerating mortgagee in return for a voluntary de-acceleration of the obligation. Presumably, 
economic self-interest of the parties will work to make such arrangements effective where they 
occur. 
47. Section 501 (c) provides that a creditor who has foreclosed may not sue on its debt except 
pursuant to the Act, but that refers only to deficiency proceedings after the foreclosure has been 
completed. The Commissioners' comments indicate that there was no intent to interfere with si-
multaneous debt and security proceedings. See ULSIA § 501 cmt. 4. 
48. They declare: 
Id. 
Under existing law in most states a lender may proceed concurrently or succesively to 
foreclose the security interest and to proceed to judgment upon the note or other evidence 
of personal obligation. This section continues that option and it therefore rejects the so-
called 'one-action' rule which exists in a few states. 
49. See. e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 726 (West 1980 & Supp. 1992). 
50. See ULSIA § 501 cmt. 4. What protection the one-action rule gives to a mortgagor has 
never been apparent. Its stated policy is to avoid allowing the mortgagor to be harassed by multi-
ple actions filed by the mortgagee, although no explanation is ever given why a mortgagee would 
find such a strategy effective or efficient. The rule is detrimental to the mortgagee by forcing it to 
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foreclosure proceeding after it has already obtained a money judgment. 
However, the scope of relief envisioned in the commentary to this sec-
tion implies tbat the mortgagee is as free to foreclose on the collateral 
after it has obtained such a judgment as it is while suing for one, and 
that it need not show that execution on the money judgment was re-
turned unsatisfied, as some states require.1I1 Only an actual double re-
covery is specifically prohibited.1i2 
B. Restrictions 
The most important restriction on the right to seek monetary relief 
is not stated explicitly but is clearly intended. Section 511 (b) provides 
that a protected party is not liable for a deficiency judgment on a 
purchase-money obligation.lis Although section 511 speaks only of defi-
ciency liability, and the monetary action described in section 501 would 
not be treated as an action for a deficiency in many jurisdictions, the 
Commissioners have stated that the antideficiency policy restricts the 
freedom of remedy policy.lI. As far as purchasing-protected parties are 
concerned, this becomes a one-action rule.lI11 
Finally, although the Act is silent on this point, the right to a 
money judgment may no doubt be waived, as when a nonrecourse note 
go to the end of the line for recourse to general assets of the mortgagor (where the collateral is 
insufficient) without offering the mortgagor any compensating benefit. since it d~ not insulate his 
other assets from the reach of the creditor after a deficiency judgment has been obtained. 
The most dangerous feature of the one·action rule comes from the fact that it may operate as 
a "sanction" defense as well as an affirmative defense, permitting a debtor who did not object to 
the creditor's pursuit of monetary relief at the outset (i.e., did not assert the one-action rule as an 
affirmative defense) to later assert that the security has been wah'ed by virtue of h:ning not been 
included in the monetary action (the sanction defense). Thus, an accidental misstep leads to impo-
sition of a heavy penalty (loss of the security) and it is not surprising that the drafters of ULSIA 
did not wish to subject lenders to those hazards. 
ACREL was in agreement. Its committee observed: "Judicial cx~nsion of this rule has cre-
ated confusion and seriously hampered mortgage financing." ACREL REPORT, supra nOle 8, at 
10. 
5!. See. e.g., N.Y. REAL PROP. PRAC. LAw. § 17:15 (McKinney 1986 & Supp. 1992). 
52. See ULSIA § 501 cmt. 4. The contents of this comment contain as many important stale-
ments of law as does the section itself. It is regrettable that these rules were not included in the 
section itself or at least organized into separate commentary. 
53. Id. § 51 I (b). See also id. § 501 cmt. 4. 
54. They declared: "[T]he purchase money secured party is not entitled to a persoll31 judg-
ment against the protected party debtor but is limited to foreclosure of his security interest." Id. 
§ 511(b). 
55. There is also a restriction on the right to sue for a money judgment in § 501 (e), which 
provides that a suit on the debt after foreclosure is permitted only according to other pro~isions of 
the Act, but that section refers to deficiency judgments and is not applicable here. 
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is employed. 
C. The Money Action 
No details are given in ULSIA regarding the nature of a mortga-
gee's action on its note, other than authorization to bring such a pro-
ceeding.56 No statutory notice need precede the filing of such an action, 
although utilization of a notice of acceleration is essential where the 
mortgagee intends to sue for the entire debt rather than merely for the 
missed installments. Apart from the fifteen-day delay built into the no-
tice of acceleration,57 the suit on the note apparently may be com-
menced immediately after a default. Even protected parties are subject 
to such immediate action.58 
The money judgment resulting from the action has a special kind 
of priority. With regard to other assets, priority is assigned as of the 
date of recordation; however, with regard to the collateral, lien priority 
relates back to the priority of the security.1I9 Uniform Commercial 
Code lawyers are familiar with this notion of relation-back,6o and inclu-
sion of this principle is consistent with ULSIA's rejection of the one-
action rule. If one perceives no harm in permitting the creditor to sue 
first on its note, there is also no reason to penalize the money judgment 
thus obtained by giving it a lower priority as to the collateral than a 
judgment on the security instrument.61 
The Act does not discuss the relation of the judgment lien to the 
collateral where relation-back priority is not obtained. What happens 
when the mortgagee obtains a money judgment that does not refer 
back to the mortgage, and then executes on the collateral? Will the 
property be sold subject to or free of the mortgage lien, which is now 
56. This omission is consistent with the Commissioners' intention to leave procedural questions 
to local civil procedure rules. See id. § 510 cmt. 1. 
57. Even the 15·day wait can be ignored, since this period relates only to acceleration and not 
to the right to sue. The complaint might have to be amended, however, after 15 days to change it 
from an action seeking an installment to an action seeking the entire debt. 
58. The various grace provisions of § 507 apply only to foreclosure proceedings, not to actions 
on the note. 
59. Section 50 I (b) provides: 
If a secured creditor reduces its claim to judgment before foreclosing under this Part, the 
judgment lien takes its normal priority as a judgment lien on the real estate unless the 
judgment specified that the obligation was secured by real estate under a recorded secur-
ity agreement identified in the judgment. 
60. See V.C.C. § 9-501(5) (1987). 
61. The Act uses "the real estate" as the referent, but it clearly refers to the collateral. See, 
e.g .• VLSIA § 501(b). 
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senior to the judgment? How should outsiders calculate their bids when 
the price they pay will satisfy not only the junior money judgment but 
the senior mortgage lien as well?62 By virtue of giving the money judg-
ment optional relation-back priority, the Commissioners created two 
sets of situations but have provided the rules for only one of them. 
v. THE NOTICE OF INTENTION TO FORECLOSE 
A mortgagee begins the process of foreclosure by disseminating a 
"notice of intention to foreclose."63 This notice is a precondition to ei-
ther judicial or power-of-sale foreclosure. Thus, a mortgagee may send 
the notice of intention to foreclose before making the subordinate deci-
sion regarding the kind of foreclosure to employ. If either type of fore-
closure is contemplated, the notice must go out. It must be sent 
whether or not a notice of acceleration was previously given; the accel-
eration notice does not render the foreclosure notice unnecessary.fU 
A. Notice of Intention to Foreclose and Notice of Acceleration 
The relationship between the notice of intention to foreclose and 
the notice of acceleration is ambiguous, and the timing of each is also 
unclear. Section 506(a) provides that--except for protected par-
ties-"the notice of intention to foreclose may be sent at any time after 
default"; the notice of acceleration, on the other hand, is to be sent 
"after the debtor's failure to perform. "615 Where a missed installment 
payment does constitute a default, the mortgagee may elect to send the 
notice of intention to foreclose at the same time, or before or after 
sending the notice of acceleration.66 
Where the notice of intention to foreclose is given at the same time 
62. It is for these reasons that some states prohibit a mortgagcc from both foreclosing and 
executing on the same property except under special circumstances. See. e.g., N.Y. CI\,. PMC. L 
& R. 5236(b) & S230(a) (McKinney 1978 & Supp. 1992). This restriction is sometimes referred 
to as an election of remedies rule, but it confines the election only in one situation. 
63. ULSIA § S06(a). 
64. Where the decision is to sue instead of foreclose, this notice is clearly unnecessary. Indeed. 
no notice may be necessary und~r the former choice. 
6S. Id. § S02(a). In light of the statutory distinction betwccn nonperformance and default 
made by § SOl, it is thus possible that different triggering events may be involved for the two 
notices. Where default is defined in the loan documents as nonpayment of an accelerated debt 
(rather than an installment) the notice of acceleration would be a required preliminary to the 
notice of intention to foreclose. 
66. The notice of intention to foreclose could even be given in lieu of a notice of acceleration if 
the creditor truly intended to have piecemeal foreclosure proceedings and successive sales of the 
security for each missed installment. How this would work under ULSIA is unknown. 
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as the notice of acceleration, judicial foreclosure proceedings may be 
commenced immediately against unprotected parties.67 However, if an 
installment note is involved, the fifteen-day grace period will compli-
cate the proceeding because the amount required to dismiss the action 
will change after two weeks-from one installment to the entire loan 
balance. Under these confusing circumstances, mortgagees will proba-
bly delay filing foreclosure actions until the debt has been fully 
accelerated.68 
The status of the time period after the notice of acceleration pe-
riod has run or has been waived, and before any notice of intention to 
foreclose has been given or any action on the note has been filed, is also 
unclear. Has the entire debt come due even though the mortgagee has 
taken no steps to collect it? Until the mortgagee elects to foreclose or 
takes other action, there appears to be no reason why the mortgagor 
should not be permitted to undo the acceleration, but the Act is silent 
on this issue. The mortgagee who does not wish to give the mortgagor 
an extended period of de-acceleration should avoid that consequence by 
timely-or even early-filing of the notice of intention to foreclose.69 
1. Notice to Protected Parties 
The notice of intention to foreclose may not be sent to protected 
parties residing on the secured property until "a payment of money has 
not been made when due and remains unpaid for five or more weeks."70 
In this case, the notice of intention to foreclose is clearly intended to be 
sent at a later time than the notice of acceleration.71 When a protected 
party is involved, the fifteen-day grace period of the notice of accelera-
tion is rather unimportant, because section 513(b) gives any protected 
party-whether or not residing on the property-up to the moment of' 
disposition on foreclosure to reinstate the installment debt by paying 
67. Id. § 507(b). 
68. Although protected parties are allowed more time to pay only the arrearages by § 513(a), 
this right does not generate the same kind of confusion because it lasts throughout the entire 
foreclosure proceeding. 
69. Comment 2 to § 507 refers to "a requirement that the creditor give the debtor 'reasonable 
notice' of an 'intention to foreclose,' " adding that "the reasonableness of the time" is a question 
of law except where it has been defined in the mortgage. However, since the Act has elsewhere 
provided that instant notice is proper in such cases, see id. § 507 cmt. 2, it is difficult to under-
stand how reasonableness could ever be a factor. 
70. Id. § 507(d). 
71. The five-week foreclosure grace period precedes the notice of intention to foreclose, 
whereas the IS-day acceleration grace period follows the giving of the notice of acceleration. 
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only the arrearages.'2 Sometime during the five-week notice of inten-
tion to foreclose waiting period, and probably at least two weeks before 
that period ends, a notice of acceleration should be sent, but there is no 
need to mark the calendar for the end of those fifteen days unless other 
parties are involved.'3 
Because notice of intention to foreclose cannot be given until five 
weeks after a missed obligation, a protected party residing on the prop-
erty has a five-week breathing space with respect to foreclosure. An 
action on the accelerated debt may be brought against him immedi-
ately after the default, but proceedings against the security are post-
poned because the notice of intention to foreclose is the first step and 
cannot be sent until five weeks later. Further delays may also follow, 
since additional five-week pauses are mandated by section 507(b) (for 
instituting judicial foreclosure proceedings against protected parties, 
whether or not they reside on the premises) and by section 509(a) (for 
conducting nonjudicial sales against all debtors). 
Many policy issues are involved here for legislatures to consider: 
(1) Is five weeks an appropriate amount of time to accomplish the pur-
poses motivating the grant of a delay period?; (2) Should the delay 
period apply to monetary actions as well as foreclosures?; (3) Should 
the delay be extended to all protected parties, even those not residing 
on the premises?; (4) Should the delay be extended to all mortgagors, 
even unprotected ones?; and (5) Since the delay involved is not the only 
delay built into the process, is it better to have longer or shorter delay 
periods later rather than here? 
Uniformity will inevitably be lost if individual jurisdictions resolve 
these issues differently, as surely they will. In some instances-for ex-
ample, five versus seven weeks-discrepancies will hardly matter, even 
to national lenders. Other variations will be more consequential, al-
though that does not make them less likely to occur. Pro-debtor legisla-
tures are simply not going to perceive fairness in the same terms as 
pro-creditor ones, and the two may arrive at very different foreclosure 
mechanisms. Only if the battle between these interests were waged in a 
national forum, such as Congress or some federal agency, could a uni-
72. The grace period, however, is important if a proteetcd party has already exercised his 
redemption rights within the past 12 months; in this case, the right to cure under § 513(b) is no 
longer available. See id. § 513(c). 
73. The Commissioners appear to intend that the two- and fh·e-week periods overlap. For ex-
ample, comments 4 and 5 to § 507 use examples of five and ten weeks (rather than seven and 
twelve weeks) for protected·party installment notes. 
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form compromise possibly be struck. The singular unifying accomplish-
ment of the Commercial Code is not likely to be repeated in the mort-
gage field where homeowners and farmers, on the one hand, and small 
investors and institutional lenders, on the other hand, have clear and 
distinct interests at stake. The compromises they may work out in indi-
vidual states might possibly be kept within the confines of an ULSIA-
type procedure, but might well destroy any common features recogniz-
able by other jurisdictions. 
2. Persons Entitled to Notice 
Under section 507(f), the notice of intention to foreclose is to be 
sent "to the person sp'ecified by the debtor ... or ... to the debtor or 
anyone of two or more debtors, but notice must be given to all debtors 
having an interest in the property who are protected parties." Notice 
also goes to persons who the creditor intends to hold liable for a defi-
ciency judgment. With regard to multiple (unprotected) debtors who 
have executed a single mortgage, each is apparently presumed to be the 
agent for the others as to receipt of notice, and the Act implies that 
only one agent may be so designated, unless the documents provide oth-
erwise.74 Conversely, every debtor who may be held liable for a defi-
ciency judgment must receive the notice, whether he is protected or 
not,'" so that the danger of non-notice from the agent applies only with 
regard to loss of the security and not to potential personal liability. 
Section 507(f) also provides for notice "to any person in possession 
of the real estate from whom the creditor has received a written de-
mand to receive notice of intention to foreclose." It is unclear why a 
party already in possession-to whom notice by mail can be sent more 
easily than to anyone else because his address is certainly 
known-must make a written demand for the notice. It is also unclear 
why the right to demand notice is given only to tenants and not to other 
parties as well. And there is no explanation as to why tenants under 
leases executed after the mortgage-who have a greater need for notice 
because their leases may be terminated by a foreclosure of their mort-
gagor /landlord's interest-are treated the same as tenants under leases 
executed before the mortgage-who may not be affected at all by the 
foreclosure. In particular, that the senior tenant can demand notice, 
whereas the junior creditor cannot, seems indefensible. 
74, See id, § 507(1), 
75, Id, 
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As indicated above, junior mortgagees have no entitlement to no-
tice of intention to foreclose. They qualify neither for automatic notice 
nor for the right to make written demand for such notice. According to 
the Commissioners, because this notice is not given for the purpose of 
cutting off interests, notices serving that function are the ones they 
should receive.76 The distinction is hard to justify. The slight burden on 
the senior in having to mail to junior creditors of record hardly out-
weighs the latter's critical need for sufficient time to take the steps to 
protect their interests from being eliminated by a senior foreclosure. 
Junior creditors, like debtors, need to receive notice as early as 
possible. Both will lose their interests following a senior foreclosure 
sale;77 both may wish to challenge the validity of the senior's claim; 
both may wish to cure the senior default to protect their own interest; 
and both generally need maximum time to do all this. Indeed, com-
pared to a protected party who can cure without acceleration, the jun-
ior's need for early notice is greater. Since the statute requires giving 
notice to tenants in possession who have requested it (without having 
recorded their leases), the mortgagee is forced to keep a log of such 
requests in any event. It would hardly be troublesome to add junior 
requests to the list. 
3. The Notice Mechanism 
Section 508(a) requires that the notice be sent by mail to the 
mortgagor's specified address (or to a better one if the mortgagee 
knows of it) as well as to any other person known to the mortgagee to 
be a good conduit to the mortgagor. There is no provision for either 
recordation or publication of the notice. In light of the previously dis-
cussed inability of junior creditors to receive notice by mail, these omis-
sions are all the more significant. The junior mortgagee cannot employ 
financial or credit services to keep her apprised of the condition of the 
senior loan if the public records and the newspapers are excluded from 
the process.78 In fact, it is possible for a junior to unwittingly make her 
loan and take a second mortgage while the first is already in 
76. See id. § 507 cmt. 6. 
77. The senior can be expected to credit bid no more than its own debt at its foreclosure sale. 
and the burden falls inevitably upon the junior to push the bidding up to an amount large enough 
to protect her own security. Because she cannot credit bid at the senior sale. she should have the 
time necessary to obtain enough cash to bid at the sale. 
78. A mortgagor may obtain a "statement of account" from the mortgagee under § 209. AI· 
though no such right is given to any junior lender, she could probably require her mortgagor to 
request one from the senior as a condition of obtaining the junior loan. 
1022 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24:1001 
foreclosure!79 
B. Contents of the Notice 
Section 508(b) provides that the notice of intention to foreclose 
must cover eleven matters. These are applicable to all mortgagors, not 
just protected parties.so All subsections are discussed below, more or 
less serial1y~ in appropriate groupings. 
1. The Security 
Section 508(b)(1) requires that the nO.tice of intention to foreclose 
clearly identify in writing "the particular security interest foreclosed." 
There is no elaboration or commentary regarding this requirement. 
Where the mortgagor has posted his entire title in the collateral as se-
curity, a simple copying of the property description from the mortgage 
is probably sufficient. Where there are junior leases that the mortgagee 
desires to preserve, the terse wording of the section may permit the 
mortgagee to describe the interest as a fraction of the collateral (i.e., 
only the reversion) in order to avoid termination of the existing leases. 
For protection, the mortgage itself should permit the mortgagee to do 
this.sl 
Where multiple security is involved and the mortgagee intends to 
reach only some of it at this time, the notice should omit the excluded 
properties. The wording of the section appears to permit such proce-
dure. To avoid any risk of waiver, however, that notice probably should 
include a caveat that the rest of the security is not being released.s2 
Little in the Act covers piecemeal foreclosure sales, except for the ref-
erence that any personal property can be treated as real property and 
included in the Act's foreclosure procedure.s3 One may surmise that 
additional notices of intention to foreclose should be sent when addi-
79. This point is reconsidered later under notice of sale. See discussion infra parts VII.B.2-3. 
80. This conclusion seems justified given the fact that there is no special mention of protected 
parties in the section. On the other hand, the Commissioners' comment to § 507 interprets § 508 
as mandating compliance with the II matters only for protected parties. See ULSIA § 507 cmt. 4. 
This reading seems plainly inconsistent with the text and official comments for § 508. 
Recall that § 112(f) mandates a warning legend on all notices sent to protected parties that 
their rights are affected. See :supra note 29. 
81. For further discussion on the survival of junior leases, see discussion infra parts XI.C.4.b-
XI.E. 
82. Another virtue of not including a one·action rule in ULSIA is that piecemeal foreclosure 
proceedings are generally more available. See :supra part IV.A. 
83. See ULSIA § 501 (e). The section was written to coordinate ULSIA with the Uniform 
Commercial Code. Id. § SOl cmt. 5; :see a/:so id. § 102(c) & cmts. 1-2. 
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tional security is being sought, but the Act is silent on this matter. 
2. Default and Cure 
Sections 508(b)(2)-(4) require that the notice of intention to fore-
close state "the nature of the default claimed" «b)(2», whether there 
has been an acceleration «b)(3», and "any right the debtor has to 
cure the default, the amount to be paid or other action necessary to 
cure, and the time within which the cure must take place" «b) (4». 
While these requirements are straightforward enough, they may have 
been forgotten when section 513-dealing with the actual process of 
curing the default and undoing acceleration-was drafted. 
It should be easy for the notice to state that a monthly payment 
has been missed and that an election to accelerate has been made.1H 
However, it will be more complicated to inform the debtor of his cure 
rights. Once the debt has been accelerated, there is no right to de-
accelerate merely by paying the arrearages, except where the debtor is 
a protected party.Stl Furthermore, unpaid tax and insurance payments 
must be cured in order to redeem, whether or not they were specified in 
the notice, and probably whether or not a protected party is involved. 
The redemption provisions of section 513 are not made dependent on 
the notice requirements of section 508, meaning that the creditor may 
demand whatever is then due as a condition of cure, whether or not it 
was specified in the notice of intention to foreclose.so A similar dispar-
ity applies to a protected party attempting to de-accelerate: section 
513(b) requires that he make his loan absolutely current and does not 
indicate that this burden is contingent upon what was specified in any 
of the r!!quired notices.s7 
The cure rights of section 513 should be taken into account when 
complying with the requirement that the notice state the amount neces-
sary to cure. At the time of the original default, only one month's pay-
ment is needed to cure if the fifteen-day notice of acceleration period 
84. The decision to accelerate is, however, to be made by a separate notice of acceleration. As 
has been noted, the' notice of intention to foreclose is permitted to include a notice of sale and 
notice of judicial foreclosure, but not a notice of acceleration. It is unknown whether acceleration 
can be accomplished by a provision in the notice of intention to foreclose where there was no 
notice of acceleration (or defective notice of acceleration) or what the effect of inconsistencies 
between the two notices would mean. 
85. ULSIA § 513(b). 
86. Id. § 5\3(b)(2). 
87. The notice is required only to disclose the debtor's right to cure. Juniors and others appar-
ently must figure out their rights for themselves. 
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has not elapsed or if the mortgagor is a protected party. If the notice 
states no more than this, the failure to say more may mean that the 
mortgagee cannot resist a tender of the one payment specified in its 
notice, even though more has since come due. Proper drafting of the 
notice, relating dates to amounts and providing for the contingency of 
other defaults (e.g., "plus tax and insurance payments if such have 
come due in the interim"), should be able to avoid these problems. Per-
haps a clause listing "any other subsequent default or amount then 
due" would be effective. 
3. Type of Foreclosure 
Section 508(b)(5) requires that the notice of intention to foreclose 
state "the methods by which the debtor's ownership of the real estate 
may be terminated." This requirement should be satisfied by a simple 
enumeration of the choices contained in section 507. Indeed, quoting 
from comment 2 of that section may be the safest way to comply. Since 
this notice may precede any choice the creditor intends to make, there 
is no reason to expect that this subsection requires anything other than 
a laundry list. Section 508(b)(10) permits the mortgagee to make the 
choice of type of foreclosure in the notice of intention to foreclose. The 
mortgagee may include a notice of sale or notice of judicial foreclosure 
in the notice of intention to foreclose.88 Comment 5 to section 507 
states that a clear indication of which method is being chosen can 
shorten the time by again permitting overlap, but it does not indicate 
why the notice of intention to foreclose might not include notices as to 
both kinds foreclosure, thereby starting the applicable periods for both 
running at once without the mortgagee having made any real elec-
tion.89 Nothing in the Act's policy of barring double recovery requires 
that an election of remedies be made at this stage or that the two reme-
dies not proceed simultaneously until the last moment.90 A creditor ex-
pecting to sell by way of power of sale might still be constrained to file 
a lawsuit to get possession and-while it is at it-include a count for 
judicial foreclosure as a precaution. The Commissioners probably had 
in mind that the mortgagee would generally make a choice-their com-
88. These other notices will be discussed later when the relevant proceedings are considered. 
See discussion infra parts VI.A. (notice of judicial foreclosure) and VII.B. (notice of sale). For 
discussion purposes, I will assume that such notices are given separately. 
89. This comment by the Commissioners fits more appropriately in § 508 than in § 507. 
90. Even in one-action jurisdictions, a creditor is not required to choose between a judicial and 
nonjudicial foreclosure sale until the last minute. 
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ment assumes a duty to make one-but the text of the Act does not 
impose one. Indeed, the section permits the mortgagee to choose not to 
make an election at this time. 
4. The Foreclosure Notice 
Sections 508(b)(6)-(9) & (II) require that the notice of intention 
to foreclose include the following elements: (1) the debtor's right to 
transfer his equity of redemption after default ((b)(6)); (2) his risk of 
dispossession during or after foreclosure ((b)(7)); (3) his right to a sur-
plus or risk of liability for a deficiency after a sale ((b)(8)-(9)); and (4) 
his right to seek judicial protection controlling the foreclosure 
((b) (I 1». These subsections call for boilerplate announcements and 
will rarely cause creditors much difficulty. The wording of the posses-
sion announcement under section 508(b)(7) may depend upon what 
clauses are in the mortgage and what decisions the mortgagee is mak-
ing with regard to possession. Similarly, the deficiency judgment an-
nouncement under section 508(b)(8) will be controlled by whether or 
not a protected-party, purchase-money loan is involvea.91 
VI. JUDICIAL FORECLOSURE 
Judicial foreclosure requires no enabling language in the mort-
gage, being a remedy available to the mortgagee as of right.92 A notice 
of intention to foreclose93 is required as a preliminary matter, but it 
91. These matters are all considered elsewhere in this Article. See discussion inffa p3rtS 
VII.C.I (debtor's right to transfer equity of redemption). VIII (risk of liability for deficiency after 
sale), X (right to surplus), X.B.-C. (right to judicial protection). and XI.A.-B. (risk of disposses-
sion after foreclosure). 
92. Conceivably. the right to judicially foreclose could be waived by appropriate language in 
the mortgage, much as the right to sue on the note or recover a deficiency judgment can be viaived 
by utilization of a nonrecourse promissory note. Similarly. the right to foreclose by way of power-
of-sale would be "waived" by mere noninclusion of a power-of-sale clause in the mortgage. It is 
hard to perceive any advantage to either party from a waiver of the possibility of judicial foreclo-
sure, but this could change if impediments were added to the power-of-sale process. b:causc a 
waiver of judicial foreclosure would then make mandatory those impediments attached to the 
power-of-sale. For example. if power-of-sale were elongated from 5 to 25 weeks in a jurisdiction 
where judicial proceedings generally took only 10 weeks to complete. a waiver of the right to 
judicially foreclose would amount to a waiver of the right to save IS weeks. 
93. See·ULSIA § S07(b). A notice of acceleration would normally also b~ sent as a prelimi-
nary first step whenever an installment note was involved. since piecemeal foreclosure proceedings 
brought after each missed installment would be an intolerable alternative. It is unclear from the 
Act whether the IS-day grace period for undoing acceleration. see [d. § 502(a). must be allowed 
to expire before commencing the judicial foreclosure action. or whether notice of acceleration and 
institution of judicial foreclosure can be done simultaneously with the foreclosure action being 
terminable in different ways before and after the IS-day period has expired. However. even after 
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may be sent immediately after any default by an unprotected party.D. 
A. Notice of Judicial Foreclosure 
Protected parties have additional entitlements as to both notices 
and time. In addition to the notice of intention to foreclose previously 
mentioned, the Act provides for a "notice of intention to commence the 
proceeding" in section 507(b). This provision appears from its context 
to refer to a judicial foreclosure action, although no such notice is in-
cluded in the index of notices contained in section 506. It also appears 
to be the same as what is referred to in 508(b)(10) as a notice of "in-
tention to institute judicial proceedings," in light of the cross reference 
there to section 507(b).D6 If this latter interpretation controls, this no-
tice need not be treated as a separate notice, but merely as a part of 
the information to be contained in the notice of intention to foreclose. 
If, however, a separate notice is intended, there is no statutory guid-
ance as to when, where, and how it must be sent. 
B. Time 
A protected-party debtor is given additional time to save his prop-
erty from a judicial foreclosure. Section 507(b) provides that "as 
against a protected party the judicial proceeding may not be com-
menced until five weeks after notice of intention to commence the pro-
ceeding has been given." Furthermore, when the protected party is also 
residing on the premises, section 507(d) adds that "the notice of inten-
tion to foreclose (section 508) may not be given until a payment of 
money has not been made when due and remains unpaid for five or 
more weeks." Because the notice of intention to commence the proceed-
ing probably cannot be sent before the notice of intention to foreclose, 
it appears that occupying protected parties have ten-weeks grace before 
judicial foreclosure proceedings can be initiated against them: five 
that time has passed, acceleration might be undone by protected parties up until "the time speci-
fied in a decree of judicial foreclosure." Id. § 513(a). There is no statutory explanation of what 
"time" is meant by this reference, but it is probably equivalent to the date a court might set for 
sale of the property, although § 510(c) provides merely that the court "shall enter judgment for 
the amount due with costs and order the sale of the real estate," which does not imply that a time 
period be specified in the decree. 
94. See id. § 506(a). 
95. The reference here is to the creditor's ability to send this notice as part of the notice of 
intention to foreclose. The context suggests that the judicial foreclosure notice should always be 
given when that is the remedy chosen, but §§ 506(c) and 510(b)(2) essentially suggest that judi-
cial foreclosure can occur without such a notice beforehand. 
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weeks from nonpayment to notice of intention to foreclose, including 
notice of intention to commmence proceedings, and then five weeks 
thereafter before the complaint may be filed.90 
C. Procedure 
Most mechanical details of the judicial foreclosure action are 
omitted, pursuant to an express policy of the Commissioners that local 
civil procedure rules should guide the action.97 Such a policy is puz-
zling, since it guarantees that there will be little uniformity among the 
states on a key component of the collection process. Even with an at-
tractive power-of-sale alternative available, foreclosure proceedings will 
be perforce judicial when there are legitimate disputes between the 
mortgagee and the mortgagor, junior lienors, guarantors or other third 
parties, because it will be safer to have these matters adjudicated in the 
main foreclosure proceeding rather than in a judicial action collateral 
to the power-of-sale proceeding, often occuring long after the sale. If 
lenders from one part of the country desire to know what they confront 
as to collection in another part of the country, an explanation that local 
procedure will govern the judicial foreclosure process is not likely to 
give them much help.9s 
Furthermore, one of the more common complaints of lenders, both 
resident and foreign, concerns the cost and time of judicial foreclosure. 
Not surprisingly, the desire to reform and economize the collection pro-
cess was one of the motivating forces behind ULSIA.99 The worst fea-
tures of many states' foreclosure processes, however, are left unchanged 
by the Act, forcing the reformers to engage in the very battles they 
probably hoped to avoid in urging the enactment of ULSIA.100 
A few common procedural steps are mandated by ULSIA. The 
complaint must show that the notice of intention to foreclose and-for 
protected parties-the "notice of intention to institute judicial proceed-
96. This circumstance seems inconsistent with § 506(c), which provides that "[a]s against a 
protected party, a judicial proceeding to foreclose cannot be commenced until after the time sp«i-
fied by section 507(b)." The nonreference to the delay mandated by § 507(d) is puzzling. 
97. See id. § 510 cmt. 1. 
98. Such incorporation of local procedure probably also guarantees that out of state lenders 
will need local counsel to explain as we\1 as to conduct judicial co\1cction proceedings in the state. 
99. See. e.g., id. § 503 cmt. I ("This Act is based on a major policy decision-to reduce the 
'cost' of foreclosure."). 
100. However, ACREL said "ULSIA affords great flexibility to each jurisdiction and states 
unwilling to eliminate judicial foreclosure for residential mortgages may nevertheless permit 
power of sale for commercial mortgages." ACREL REPORT, supra note 8, at 15. 
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ings" were given, and that a deficiency judgment is not barred (pro-
vided one is sought).lOl Service of process must be made on all parties 
having inferior interests of record, whether or not they were entitled to 
receive the notice of intention to foreclose under section 507(0.102 On 
the other hand, since the service entitlement is given only to persons 
whose interests are of record, junior tenants whose leases were not re-
corded but whose possession would otherwise put creditors on notice of 
their existence do not appear to qualify, unless they made a written 
demand for notice of intention to foreclose. loa 
The possibility that such junior tenants may have their interests 
terminated even without being included as parties in the foreclosure 
action raises the perverse question of what the creditor must do if it 
desires to preserve rather than terminate junior leases. Under a set of 
rules that requires that such tenants be served before their leases are 
terminated, nonservice :would be the device for accomplishing 
nontermination. But how does one omit a party whose presence was not 
required in the first place? Mortgagees must draft their pleadings more 
carefully to make clear that only reversionary interests are being 
foreclosed. 
Section 5IO(c) also contains provisions calling for a judgment de-
claring the amount due, ordering a sale, and naming the seller, who can 
be anyone, including debtor or creditor.l04 It provides that the sale 
should be conducted in the same manner as are nonjudicial foreclosure 
sales, pursuant to section 509. However, the next section, 5IO(d), im-
poses a requirement not mentioned in section 509: The seller must seek 
buyers and bidders by reasonable means of communica-
tion-notwithstanding any service by publication-suggesting that 
there may be some difference between these mechanisms and those pre-
scribed for nonjudicial sales.l05 The section closes with mechanical pro-
visions for return and confirmation of the sale and clerical entry of a 
deficiency judgment (section 51O(e)), execution of a foreclosure deed 
101. See id. § 510(b). 
102. See id. § 510(c). For power-of-sale foreclosures, § 509(a) limits notice to parties of rec-
ord at least seven weeks prior to the date of intended sale. See infra part VII.B. That limitation is 
not mentioned here, indicating that all recorded junior interest should be served. 
103. See § 507(0, which is incorporated into § 510(c) for service requirements. 
104. Clarity is not helped by lumping provisions relating to the judgment and the sale in the 
paragraph dealing with service of process; still, the individual rules are easy enough to understand. 
Adding to the sense of poor organization is the mislocation of the provision recommending that 
the decree contain a date for the foreclosure sale; this provision is found in § 513(a), which other-
wise deals with redemption. 
105. See discussion infra part VII.D. 
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(section 510(0), an order putting the buyer in possession where neces-
sary (section 510(g», and an allowance for strict foreclosure where it 
does exist (section 51O(h».loB 
Overall, there is little in the judicial foreclosure features of UL-
SIA to cause one to support or oppose it. Where ULSIA is enacted, 
some clarifying amendments will be necessary, but that will not be dif-
ficult to accomplish. The failure of the Commissioners to take any real 
interest in the judicial foreclosure process is a serious drawback of the 
Act. Interested persons in those jurisdictions who have or want the ju-
diciary involved in collection proceedings will achieve neither uniform-
ity nor reform from ULSIA and will probably concentrate their ener-
gies elsewhere. Notwithstanding a strong desire to permit nonjudicial 
power-of-sale proceedings, the Commissioners may have been too inat-
tentive to the necessary alternatives. Judicial foreclosure may well be-
come the stepchild of the power-of-sale process, but it will still be a 
member of the family. 
The mortgagor is permitted to redeem during the judicial foreclo-
sure process. This is discussed later in the context of power-of-sale fore-
closure proceedings.lo7 
VII. POWER OF SALE 
Section 509(a) provides that a mortgagee who "is authorized to 
foreclose by power of sale ... after the debtor's default and upon com-
pliance with this section, may sell any or all of the real estate that is 
subject to the security interest." By this provision, ULSIA thus autho-
rizes nonjudicial foreclosure sales by mortgagees. lOB Disposition of the 
collateral becomes possible without the necessity of judicial foreclosure 
proceedings and its attendant costs and delays. Although not explicitly 
stated, the desire to make available such an alternative remedy is 
clearly a major motivation for the promulgation of the Act. Lenders 
from judicial foreclosure states have long looked enviously at the seem-
ing convenience and cheapness of collection efforts open to their rivals 
106. This probably refers to the procedure brought against previously omitted juniors rather 
than the method employed in Connecticut and Vermont for terminating a mortgagor's interest. 
See ULSIA § 510 cmt. 8. 
107. See discussion infra part VII.C. 
108. This entitlement is duplicated by § 507(c)'s provision that "[i]f the security agreement or 
other agreement between the debtor and secured creditor authorizes it, the creditor, after the 
debtor's default and after giving the debtor notice of intention to foreclose (Section 508), may 
terminate the debtor's interest by exercising a power of sale." It is not app:uent what either prO'.;-
sion adds to the other. 
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in power-of-sale jurisdictions; understandably, they hope to have this 
procedure available throughout the country. 
For a mortgagee to sell the mortgagor's property on foreclosure 
without judicial action, ULSIA requires three writings: (1) a power-of-
sale provision in the mortgage; (2) a notice of intention to foreclose;lo9 
and (3) a "notice of intended sale." 
A. The Power-ol-Sale Clause 
Section 507(c) requires that the mortgage authorize a power- of-
sale for the creditor to dispose of the collateral without a judicial fore-
closure. The Act could have provided, as a few states do, that this rem-
edy was available to any mortgagee, with or without such a clause in 
its mortgages, since there is no doubt that all mortgages will contain 
such provisions wherever the Act becomes law. Other rights are given 
by ULSIA to mortgagees without the need for boilerplate language,110 
and the power-of-sale provision would have been another appropriate 
candidate for such treatment. In those jurisdictions where such a provi-
sion is available and efficacious, it is so universally employed that many 
mortgagors and mortgagees believe it to be the only way of foreclosing 
on the collateral.ll1 There is no statutory guidance as to how the 
power-of-sale clause must be worded: "Together with power to sell the 
collateral" is probably sufficient, but there would be no harm in 
describing what that remedy consists of, especially by language bor-
rowed from the Act. 
B. The Notice of Sale 
Section 506(b) provides that no foreclosure under a power-of-sale 
can occur unless a "notice of intended sale" has been given, and refers 
readers to section 509(a) for the content of that notice. Section 509(a) 
109. The following sections of this Article omit discussion of the notice of intention to fore-
close which was treated earlier. See discussion supra part V. Recall, however, that this notice is a 
prerequisite to any form of foreclosure. It may include the notice of sale, see ULSIA § S06(b), 
discussed here as a separate notice merely for convenience. See discussion infra part VII.B. 
110. See, e.g., the inclusion of rents as part of the security, discussed infra part XI. 
III. There is the danger that putting the power-of-sale on a statutory rather than contractual 
basis might make it appear to be state action and therefore more subject to constitutional scrutiny 
on questions of notice and opportunity to be heard. While one federal circuit court has held that 
state action is not involved even in the presence of a statute authorizing powers of sale, see 
Charmicor v. Deaner, 572 F.2d 694 (9th Cir. 1978), it is nevertheless the case that the customary 
basis of denying state action in the power-of-sale is the fact that the power is granted by the 
mortgagor rather rather than the legislature. 
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provides that the creditor must give "reasonable written notice of the 
time and place of any public sale or if a private sale is intended, rea-
sonable notice of intention to enter into a contract to sell and of the 
time after which a private disposition may be made." Because the sec-
tion also provides that "sale may not be held until five weeks after the 
sending of the notice," the notice is effectively required to set a sale 
date at least five weeks in the future. That the notice of intention to 
foreclose may not be sent until five weeks after a missed payment1l2 
likely means that sale will be delayed for ten weeks after the default, 
because it is unlikely that the notice of sale can be given before the 
notice of intention to foreclose. 
The timetable for a public sale is easy to follow: a notice sent on 
January 1 must set an auction date no earlier than February 5. It is 
less clear how the calendar applies to a "private sale" or "private dispo-
sition." The five-week requirement applies to a "sale" and thus appears 
to cover private as well as public sales, but the "time and place" re-
quirement relates only to the public sale, not the private sale, and it is 
the "private disposition" rather than "contract to sell" which requires a 
specified date. With regard to private sales, it is difficult to tell whether 
the section means that no contract of sale may be entered into until five 
weeks after the notice was given or that escrow for such a contract may 
not close until five weeks after the notice.1l3 The latter (five weeks for 
escrow to close) seems more realistic because it will be hard for the 
mortgagee to predict when it can find a purchaser.u" It also may be 
fairer to other parties whose interests in having the property sold for a 
fair price are best protected by a notice advising them of the terms of 
the actual sale. lUi 
There is no statutory guidance as to how a creditor proceeds when 
its plans are to sell the property at a public auction in a case where the 
creditor has been unable to locate a private buyer before that time. It is 
also unclear what a creditor should do when it receives an attractive 
offer to purchase prior to the date previously noticed for public auction. 
These situations seem not contemplated by the Commissioners. 
112. See ULSIA § 507(d). Protected parties are also entitled to a s~ial Warning legend in 
the notice pursuant to § 112(0. 
113. Indeed, it may mean that five weeks must precede each of these two events. 
114. Although the section could refer to the date when the prop1:rty might be listed for sale. 
115. This reading is rendered somewhat less probable by the failure or the statute to require 
that a notice of intention to sell privately include ~he terms or that private sale. 
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1. When to Give the Notice of Sale 
The notice of sale may-except in the case of a protected 
party-be given immediately after default. Section 506(b) provides 
that it may be included in the notice of intention to foreclose, or by 
way of a separate writing given at the same time as the notice of inten-
tion to foreclose, or at a later date. Section 509(e) adds that if the 
notice of sale is given as part of the notice of intention to foreclose, the 
five-week period starts from the date of the notice of intention to fore-
close. That, however, requires the mortgagee to immediately set a time 
and place for sale. If the mortgagee intends to send its notice of sale at 
a later time, one would not expect the notice of intention to foreclose to 
say anything about the sale. lIS For protected parties, the notice of sale 
may still be included in the notice of intention to foreclose, since it is 
the notice of intention to foreclose which is held up for five weeks after 
the missed installment. The Commissioners seem to have intended that 
the mortgagee not send out a notice of sale prior to a notice of inten-
tion to foreclose,117 thus imposing the ten-week delay for the final sale. 
2. Who Receives the Notice of Sale 
The Commissioners have provided for a different dissemination of 
the notice of sale than for the earlier notice of intention to foreclose. 
Although the notice of intention to foreclose need be sent only to some 
debtors and requesting possessors,1I8 the notice of sale must go to any 
party with a recorded interest in the property.u° The problems created 
by failing to communicate a notice of intention to foreclose to junior 
creditors already have been discussed. Because the mortgagee must 
now make a title search in order to determine who is entitled to receive 
the notice of sale,t20 the only savings generated from not having had to 
make that search for the earlier notice of intention to foreclose occurs 
when the mortgagor cures the default in between the two notices.l21 
116. See ULSIA § 508(b)(IO). 
117. The final sentence of § 506(b) provides that the notice of sale may be given slmultane-
ously or at a later time; it makes no reference to the possibility of it being given before the notice 
of intention to foreclose. 
118. See id. § 507(0. 
119. See id. § 509(a). 
120. This is noted by the Commissioners in comment 1 to § 509. 
121. Furthermore, because the Commissioners have provided for inclusion of the notice of sale 
within the notice of intention to foreclose, it is clear that they did not contemplate such an interim 
period as a matter of course. Whenever the two notices are combined, junior creditors will surely 
receive both of them, since it would be highly uneconomic for a senior to prepare two different sets 
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A junior creditor is entitled to notice of sale only if she was of 
record seven weeks before the date set for sale, even though the notice 
of sale can set the sale for five weeks. No explanation is given for this 
peculiar timetable. Literally applied, a senior searching the records 
may actually see the recorded junior interest and yet be entitled to 
avoid giving her notice by pushing up the date of sale! A junior fearing 
this predicament can do nothing except have the junior loan funds im-
pounded for two weeks. Because a loan condition request may not yet 
reveal a default, she cannot make a written demand for later notice and 
its existence on the records will not help her. 
As for other parties, such as guarantors and judgment lienors, the 
Act does not say whether they are entitled to receive this notice. They, 
like junior mortgagees, also have no statutory guidance regarding what 
to do if they disagree with what the notice asserts. 
3. Nonrecordation and Nonpublication 
There is no requirement that either the notice of intention to fore-
close or the notice of sale be recorded122 or published. This is inconse-
quential to interested parties who have learned of the sale from the 
mails, but seriously affects others who are not entitled to receive notice 
by mail. When combined with the fact that there is no provision for 
requesting notice of intention to foreclose or notice of sale, either by 
direct communication with the mortgagee or by recording such a re-
quest, the effect is that interested outsiders have no way of keeping 
themselves informed as to the status of the property or of the loan. 
C. Redemption 
During the notice-of-sale waiting period,123 section 513 gives the 
debtor and holder of any subordinate interest the right to "cure or re-
of mailings when one will do. 
The fact that the two notices can be combined also disposes of any argument that the notice 
of intention to foreclose is not sent to the junior in order to splre the mortgagor from emb:lrrass-
ment if he is able to cure before a notice of sale goes out, because the existence of consolidated 
notices means that the juniors may well learn anyway. 
122. Perhaps because of the lack of any recordation requirement, the definition of notice in 
§ 112 does not include traditional constructive notice from the records. 
123. Redemption is also applicable to judicial foreclosure sales. Because ULSIA refers to it as 
a right to "cure the debtor's default," this right to redeem should not arise until a default has 
occurred. Of course, the right to redeem does not arise in a meaningful sense until some notice has 
been sent to the party in jeopardy. During the IS-day noticc-of-acceleration period, the right of all 
parties to de-accelerate should not be treated as a redemption at all within the statutory frame-
work (although conventionally one might certainly refer to that as "curing" a default). 
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deem" the default. Redemption by way of de-acceleration of an accel-
eration installment obligation-a privilege available only to protected 
parties-has been covered previously;124 what is considered in this sec-
tion is cure by way of payment of the entire obligation.11lG That right is 
available to all parties.126 
Redemption requires tendering127 the full amount of the accelera-
tion obligation, "plus reasonable expenses of proceeding to foreclosure 
incurred at the time of tender,"128 "~ncluding reasonable attorney's fees 
of the creditor."129 
I. Competing Redemptions 
Section 513(e) creates a system of priorities for competing "ten-
ders of redemption," providing that a tender by the second "prevails" 
over a tender by the third, and that both prevail over a tender by the 
debtor. It thus attempts to avoid the problems of "scrambled" redemp-
tion and the uncertain status of a second lien after the holder of a third 
lien has redeemed from a foreclosure sale conducted by the first lienor. 
It is unlikely, however, that the Act accomplishes this goal because the 
priority of tender principal is not backed up by appropriate calendar 
periods giving a party with prior redemption rights the exclusive privi-
lege of doing so. It is possible for the holder of the third lien to redeem 
immediately after default and before the holder of the second attempts 
to do the same. "Prevail" might mean to have the power to re-redeem 
124. See discussion supra part III.B. 
125. I will refer to this right as one of redemption, in contrast to the previously discussed right 
of de-acceleration. 
126. Even for a protected party, there is a right of redemption distinct from the right of de-
acceleration, because he may de-accelerate a defaulted obligation only once every 12 months. 
ULSIA § 513(c). A second default in the same year would generate a right of redemption but not 
de-acceleration. Whether a protected party could elect to redeem by paying the obligation in full 
even though he was entitled to do so by paying only the arrearages is not covered by the Act. The 
Commissioners reflected concern about this possibility in their treatment of prepayment penalty 
clauses, but do not address it directly. Of course, if a prepayment penalty clause is permitted to 
apply to prepayment by way of redemption, the question of whether the mortgagor may redeem 
without de-acceleration (i.e. pay the entire debt) is moot. 
127. A protected party undertaking to de-accelerate his debt may do so by "paying or tender-
ing," see ULSIA § 513(b)(I), whereas only "tendering" is used in § 513(a). It is unlikely that 
any significance was intended. 
128. Id. § 513(a). Again, the phraseology changes slightly for the protected party, who must 
pay (or tender) "the costs of proceeding to foreclose reasonably incurred after notice of intention 
to foreclose." [d. § 513(b)(3). This calculation can lead to a different amount, but was probably 
not intended to do so. 
129. [d. § 513(a). See discussion infra part X.C. 
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from a previous inferior redemptioner and to refuse subsequent re-
demption by an inferior redemptioner, but then the priorities appear 
backwards, since redemption is always a right held by an inferior 
against a superior. l3O Finally, apart from stating that the mortgagor 
has the lowest right of redemption, the section does not provide for the 
consequences to the junior creditors when the mortgagor does redeem; 
one would anticipate that their liens "reattach," but the section does 
not say. 
The section permits the redemptioner131 to demand an assignment 
of the defaulted mortgage either to him personally or to "any person 
designated by the payer." The Commissioners intended this latter pro-
vision to facilitate the debtor's right of redemption by permitting him 
to transfer the existing mortgage to his source of new funding.132 How-
ever, it applies to any redemptioner who pays the entire obligation-as 
all except protected parties must do after acceleration has taken ef-
fect-and thus formalizes the benefits they would otherwise have under 
principles of subrogation.133 
2. Duration 
There is no post-sale right of redemption.134 Thus, redemption 
ends once the sale is completed. Section 513(a) provides for redemption 
"[a]t any time before the earlier of the sale or a contract of sale under 
a power of sale or before the time specified in a decree of judicial fore-
closure." The reference to the contract of sale is probably to the date of 
execution rather than the date of performance of that contract.13G The 
date for a judicial foreclosure sale may move back when the sale is 
postponed, although one can argue that the different ways of referring 
to nonjudicial and judicial sales force a different result. In light of in-
creasing opposition to post-sale redemption because of its adverse im-
130. Furthermore, if "prevailing" refers to re-redeeming, then the references should ~ to pri-
ority of redemptions, not tenders of redemption. 
131. Comment 4 to § 513 refers to this right as the debtor's, but the tcxt of the section shows 
clearly that it is a right of any party who is entitled to redeem. The opening sentence of § 513(e) 
is made mysteriously conditional upon the debtor being entitled to redeem. but the rights of re-
demption thereafter conferred are not confined to the debtor. 
132. See ULSIA § 513 cmt. 4. 
133. The only time an assignment may not be demanded is "where the secured creditor OV'-I\S 
a subordinate security interest that is not to be assigned." ULSIA § 513(e). This cxception is not 
explained in the comments to the section. 
134. See id. § 513 cmt. 1. 
135. If the date of performance was intended, the contract itself would have to be made con-
tingent upon there being no redemption before the date set for closing. 
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pact on bidding, it is not surprising that the fall of the hammer or the 
close of escrow is the absolute end of the mortgage relationship. 
D. The Sale 
Sale pursuant to a power-of-sale clause differs from sale following 
judicial foreclosure more with regard to the steps antecedent to the sale 
than with the sale itself. The final act of selling, whether conducted by 
a public official after a judicial foreclosure or by the mortgagee follow-
ing the steps required for a power-of-sale, will look relatively similar. 
Not surprisingly, therefore, ULSIA prescribes similar steps for both 
judicial and power-of-sale foreclosure sales.136 The two most significant 
features of the Act are that first, the sale may be by private negotiation 
rather than public auction, and second, rather than prescribe details of 
either kind of sale, ULSIA instead mandates an across-the-board stan-
dard of reasonableness. Thus, section 509(a) provides that "[slale may 
be at a public sale or by private negotiation, by one or more contracts, 
as a unit or in parcels, at any time and place, and on any terms includ-
ing sale on credit, but every aspect of the sale, including the method, 
advertising, time, place and terms, must be reasonable."137 The section 
also permits the mortgagee to purchase at any public sale or at a pri-
vate sale not conducted by it. 
The private negotiation option is entirely new and it is difficult to 
predict how useful mortgagees will find this alternative to be. The lack 
of statutory guidance may, at least at the outset, be a considerable de-
terrent, since the burden of reasonableness is oppressive when no guide-
lines are available.138 The only rules ULSIA provides to the mortgagee 
who is contemplating a private rather than public foreclosure sale are: 
(1) that the notice of sale must include a statement of intent to enter 
into such a transaction; and (2) that the sale must be "conducted by a 
fiduciary or other person not related to the creditor."139 The problems 
136. See id. § 51O(c) & cmt. 4. 
137. ACREL found this approach "to be a reasonable trade·off for the elimination of the 
application of state fraudulent transfer law to noncollusive sales and ... helpful in avoiding the 
Bankruptcy Code's § 548 fraudulent transfer provisions." ACREL REPORT, supra note 8, at 16; 
see also II U.S.C. § 548 (1988). The issue of foreclosures as fraudulent transfers is considered in 
another paper. See Jan Z. Krasnowiecki, Uniform Land Security Interest Act and the Bankruptcy 
Courts: Divergent Policies?, 24 CONN. L. REV. 1075 (1992). 
These uLSIA provisions are included in the same subsection and same paragraph as cover 
the question of pre-sale notice to debtors and juniors. Such separate topics would have been better 
assigned to distinct sections. 
138. See discussion infra part VII.D.1. 
139. uLSIA § 509(a). 
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with the first requirement have already been discussed.l'o Regarding 
the second, it is hard to conceive of how a mortgagee can negotiate to 
purchase its mortgagor's property on foreclosure, even when a fiduciary 
represents the mortgagor.l'l This entire arrangement is so novel that it 
will probably be greeted with considerable skepticism initially and will 
need time to convince doubters that it is truly a workable and fair pro-
cedure if it is that. In addition to the blanket authorization for it given 
by ULSIA, a lender intending to utilize such a procedure would be 
well-advised to provide for it specially in the mortgage documents, in 
order to make sure that the mortgagor cannot claim surprise if it 
occurs.142 
1. Reasonableness 
The enormous latitude that section 509 affords lenders as to the 
details of sale is significantly tempered by the absence of any safe 
harbors. No standard is more terrifying to a lender than one of reason-
ableness, which too often is measured by what a judge or jury says 
about its conduct after the event is completed and the mortgagor has 
filed suit because of the unwanted consequences that followed. Reason-
ableness may be an attractive notion to plaintiff litigators, but not to 
real estate attorneys, whose task is to advise their clients how to behave 
ahead of time. A mortgagee much prefers a concrete directive, even if 
it is unreasonable, over freedom of action subject to a requirement of 
reasonableness. 
Some aspects of foreclosure reasonableness seem fairly objective 
and hence trouble-free. The time requirement is one example: A public 
sale held at midnight on a weekend clearly would have been unreasona-
bly scheduled.l '3 However, other aspects drift off rapidly into gray ar-
140. See discussion supra part VII.B. 
141. "Fiduciary" is not defined in the Act, but it is most unlikely that the Commissioners 
intended that an agent or party in fiduciary relationship to the mortgagor act as foreclosure seller 
or auctioneer of the property on behalf of the mortgagee. The phrase is: "if the sale is conducted 
by a fiduciary or other person not related to the creditor." Id. § 509(a). 
142. There is some irony in requiring mortgagees to include power-of·sale clauses in their 
mortgages in order to have what is now the everyday remedy of a private auction sale in many 
jurisdictions, while not requiring that any further language be included in the instrument in order 
to obtain this new extraordinary remedy of a private negotiated sale. A "power of private negoti-
ated sale clause" would be a far more sensible optional requirement than the con ... entional power-
of-sale clause. 
143. Another unhappy consequence of the failure to prescribe by statute a precise time and 
place for public foreclosure sales is that any opportunity for a functioning real estate market is 
thereby lost. Were ULSIA to mandate, for example. that all sales be held at noon on the first 
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eas. Was it reasonable, for instance, to locate the sale at the mortgaged 
premises rather than at the mortgagee's branch office or at city hall? 
Was it reasonable to advertise the property in the real estate section of 
the Sunday newspaper only, or should advertisements also have been 
placed in the various throw-away real estate papers found in racks on 
most street corners?l44 Was a demand that all bids at the sale be in 
cash reasonable where that condition drove away persons who would 
have otherwise bid (if the selling creditor was not a lending institution 
who could extend credit)? Fixed legislative rules as to these details are 
preferable to post facto judicial resolution. As soon as one court has 
publicly upheld some feature of a sale as reasonable, it will probably 
become the universal norm for all future sales due to the natural, cau-
tious conservatism of lenders and their counsel. . 
Reasonableness also poses problems with regard to decisions to sell 
"by one or more contracts, as a unit or in parcels."l4G The mortgagee 
who elects to sell piecemeal must risk facing criticism that this action 
precluded the opportunity to obtain a larger bid for the property as a 
developable whole; conversely, one who sells in bulk must be prepared 
to defend against a claim that piecemeal sales would have left the 
mortgagor with some unsold parcels at the end, or would have better 
protected whatever marshalling rights the juniors may have had.us 
The elusiveness of a reasonableness standard is most threatening 
with regard to deciding on private sale disposition of the collateral. 
Was it reasonable, for instance, to have sold the collateral by private 
negotiation if the mortgagor subsequently produces a person who de-
clares that he would have bid or outbid the actual purchaser had the 
Tuesday of the month at the courthouse, serious bidders, as well as bargain hunters and others, 
could attend more readily and sometimes generate prices more closely approximating market 
values. 
144. The Commissioners' remark extensively on advertising in their comments to § 509. They 
conclude that a legal notice alone is not reasonable, but that an advertisement in the real estate or 
financial section of the newspaper would be reasonable. However, they then admonish that em-
ployment of a broker "may be the more reasonable method," which unavoidably leaves the reader 
with the impression that a newspaper ad alone might also be unreasonable. 
This standard is supplemented somewhat by § 510(d), governing judicial sales. Although 
such sales are mandated to follow the same procedures as sales under the power-of-sale clause, see 
ULSIA § 509(c), this section adds that the person conducting the sale "must seek potential buy-
ers and bidders through means of communication reasonable for the type of real estate involved" 
even though all parties with interest in the property have been served in the action. Comment 4 to 
§ 510 claims that this requirement is a repetition of the same requirement for nonjudicial sales; 
the text, however, is clearly different. 
145. Id. § 509(a). 
146. Section 104 provides that ULSIA is not intended to displace local marshalling principles. 
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sale been public? Was it reasonable to advertise a public sale in the 
newspaper, but not to put the property into a multiple listing file for 
private sale, or vice versa? Was it reasonable to cancel-or not to can-
cel-a scheduled public auction once a private offer to purchase was 
received ?147 
Since all of these questions are passed over by ULSIA, mortgagees 
must obtain statutory or judicial guidance on a state-by-state basis. 
National institutional lenders will know that, wherever their loans are, 
they will be subject to a standard of reasonable foreclosure, but in or-
der to know the actual content of that standard, they must continue to 
ask local counsel despite the existence of a uniform statute. With re-
gard to other aspects of the foreclosure process, the drafters of ULSIA 
were willing to go into significant detaiPC8 It is regrettable that they 
did not apply that same attention to the foreclosure sale. 
2. Achieving Fair Prices 
The age-old problem of foreclosure sales for mortgagors is that 
such sales inevitably fail to generate prices close to the market values 
of the properties sold. Often, such disparities are merely a result of 
distressed times, when no real estate is equal to the value it had earlier. 
Even apart from those situations, it is rare to see bidding at a foreclo-
sure sale approach the price a private voluntary negotiated sale would 
have achieved. An outstanding accomplishment for ULSIA would be to 
avoid such discrepancies. The power to sell privately may accomplish 
that, and if it does, both mortgagors and mortgagees may come to find 
that the preferred method of disposition. The auction sale alternative 
contains no innovations likely to offer much help. The requirement of 
reasonableness may serve to inform more persons of the impending 
sale, but the structural inconveniences of no preliminary title report, 
difficulties in inspecting the property, lack of a standardized and cen-
tralized place and time for sale, and the inability to make conditional 
bids will shrink the pool of potential buyers down to those informed, 
strong, and risk-minded enough to demand the high profits that come 
from underbidding. The elimination of these unnecessary cost-generat-
ing features of foreclosure sales would be welcomed by all observers. 
147. Even if the parties stipulate as to these details in the mortgage. the question of reasona-
bleness will remain, along with the additional questions of whether such stipulations constitute 
impermissable attempts to waive the mortgagors' rights to reasonableness. 
148. See, e.g., the treatment of the duties of a mortgagee in possession, discussed infra part 
XI.A. 
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3. Bidding at the Sale 
Section 509(a) also provides that the mortgagee may bid at its 
own sale. A comment to the section adds that the mortgagee may itself 
conduct the sale.149 Section 509(b) provides that the high bidder at the 
sale, unless he is the selling mortgagee,lGO must deposit at least ten 
percent of his bid in cash or bank paper. It is regrettable that some 
arrangement to permit a junior to credit-bid her own claim-assuming 
she can find the cash necessary to cover the senior lien-was not made. 
The Act does not indicate whether it would be reasonable for a senior 
mortgagee to agree to permit a junior creditor to bid on credit, al-
though any unreasonableness in making such an arrangement might be' 
avoided by engaging in a private negotiated sale to the junior. 
The successful bidder has five weeks to complete his purchase or 
else become subject to specific performance or forfeiture of the ten per-
cent deposit.1G1 There is no provision for making the bid conditional on 
either a title report or a physical inspection. A bidder is thus forced to 
take his chances in this regard, and may be expected to reduce his bid 
accordingly to cover this risk. 
Finally, after the deed is executed and delivered, the Act wisely 
insulates a bona fide purchaser from post-sale attack, even when the 
proceedings were defective.m The deed recites that the proceedings 
were proper and the purchaser is not required to inquire further into 
those matters. Finality and insulation of the sale are created, according 
to the comments, in order to "further assure that the sale price at the 
foreclosure sale will be more closely related to the real market value of 
the property."lG3 
149. There is no such rule in the text of the section. While the lack of any prohibition against 
the mortgagee conducting the foreclosure sale should indicate that such procedure is permissible, 
it would always be open for the mortgagor or other party to contend that this arrangement was 
"unreasonable" under the circumstances. 
150. Although the selling mortgagee may be expected to credit bid what it is owed, ULSIA 
does not specify whether any amount over that be in cash; surely this would be required. 
151. Ten percent is a large amount to retain as liquidated damages; such a requirement may 
have to be reconciled with the jurisdiction's general rules on liquidated damages and penalty 
clauses in real estate contracts generally. 
152. See ULSIA § 512(a). 
153. See id. § 512 cmt. 1. 
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4. Improper Sales 
Where the sale has been mishandled, creditor liability is provided 
for in section 514(b).11i4 Noncompliance with sale requirements is spe-
cifically listed as a basis for liability.llili Mortgagors and other parties 
who were entitled to notice may recover from the mortgagee for "any 
loss caused." A protected party may recover up to $500 without proof 
of harm, as well as attorney's fees and litigation costs. Liability would 
necessarily be confined to the foreclosing mortgagee, since the foreclo-
sure purchaser is protected by the recitals in the foreclosure deed. 
VIII. DEFICIENCY JUDGMENTS 
With the exception of nonrecourse notes and protected-party pur-
chasers, ULSIA provides for general deficiency liability. Section 
511(b) provides that "a person who owes payment of an obligation se-
cured is liable for any deficiency." The comments to this section indi-
cate that the liability applies after either a judicial or nonjudicial 
sale.lli6 
A. 'In Judicial Foreclosure Proceedings 
Both the notice of intention to foreclose and the complaint in the 
action must cover the deficiency question. The notice of intention to 
foreclose must state the mortgagor's potential deficiency liabilitylli7 and 
the mortgagee's intent to seek a deficiency judgment,11i8 and must be 
served upon any party who may be held responsible for payment of 
it.159 The complaint in the foreclosure action must also cover it.lllo The 
deficiency judgment is entered by the court in the action after the 
judge has confirmed the sale; the amount appears to be calculated sim-
ply by subtracting the sale price (less expenses and costs) from the 
IS4. Section S13(a) permits pre·sale injunctive relief where the problem is one that the mort-
gagor knows of beforehand. 
ISS. See id. § 513(a)(3). Technically, bad procedures arc listed only as grounds for injunctive 
rather than monetary relief, but it is unlikely that such a distinction was intended. 
IS6. See id. § Sll(b) cmt. 2. 
IS7. ·Id. § S08(b)(8) ("[I]f the debtor is or may be liable for any deficiency, a statement of 
the circumstances under which the deficiency will be asserted."). 
IS8. Id. § S08(b)(9) ("that no deficiency mayor will be claimed if that is the case."). The Act 
does not impose any sanction for failing to include this statement or the one mentioned in the 
previous note. See supra note 157. Omission of such critical information should estop the mortga-
gee from thereafter seeking a deficiency judgment unless it is \\illing to start all over again. 
IS9. See id. § S07(f). 
160. Id. § SI0(b)(2) ("[I]f a deficiency judgment is claimed, the secured creditor shall state 
that the prohibition against a deficiency judgment is not applicable. "). 
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amount due (plus costs).l6l Thereafter, it functions as an ordinary 
money judgment without any superpriority.162 
B. In Power-ol-Sale Proceedings 
The notice of intention to foreclose must state that a deficiency 
judgment may be sought. The notice of sale, however, is not required to 
do so, which means that those outsiders who receive only that notice 
will not be aware of the pending deficiency judgment. It is hard to 
contend that they have any need to know. Anyone who might be liable 
for the deficiency judgment was required to get the notice of intention 
to foreclose pursuant to section 507(f). Perhaps a junior mortgagee 
who knows that she will be wiped out by the senior sale might decide to 
sue on her note for a general money judgment and would then want to 
have priority over any deficiency judgment obtained by the senior mort-
gagee. But the senior must file its own money action in such a case, 
since the power-of-sale proceeding cannot generate a court judgment. 
The senior could, if it wanted, file such an action even before it began 
to proceed under its power-of-sale. 
There is no statutory mechanism for entering a deficiency judg-
ment after a nonjudicial sale, and the mortgagee will undoubtedly be 
required to file a lawsuit in order to obtain the requisite money judg-
ment. It does not appear that the mortgagee seeking both to foreclose 
under its power-of-sale and also to obtain a money judgment for the 
balance must await the completed sale before filing the lawsuit. The 
power granted to the mortgagee by section 501(a) to "reduce the per-
sonal obligation ... to judgment" applies to actions filed before or after 
the foreclosure occurs.16S There seems to be no reason why an action 
for the entire debt filed at the outset could not be amended into a defi-
ciency action if a sale has occurred in the meantime. Alternatively, fil-
ing of the complaint could be postponed until the sale had occurred and 
an actual deficiency existed. l64 
161. The amount subtracted is described in § SI0(e). The total from which it is subtracted is 
described in § SIO(c). 
162. Id. § SI0(e). The statutory provision for relation-back priority applies only to a money 
judgment obtained before a foreclosure sale and only with regard to the collateral itself, not to the 
mortgagor's general assets. See id. § 501 (b). 
163. Compare § 501 (b) and (c) on this timing issue. 
164. In this case, the amount recovered at the sale should certainly be credited against the 
debt. The Commissioners refer to a policy of preventing double recovery in § 501 (c). See also Id. 
§ 50 I cmt. 4. It is arguable whether the Act actually imposes such a rule, but usual rules of 
pleading and practice would probably prohibit it anyway. 
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As to a post-nonjudicial sale deficiency proceeding, the Act is sin-
gularly unhelpful. Section 501(c) provides that a mortgagee who has 
foreclosed "may not bring a judicial proceeding to recover the debt ex-
cept as provided in this Part," but no provision for that proceeding ap-
pears to exist.1SI> Nowhere does the Act make any reference to an ac-
tion filed to obtain a deficiency judgment after a nonjudicial sale has 
been held. Presumably, the complaint would allege both the original 
debt and the subsequent foreclosure sale and pray for a money judg-
ment for the balance. Such judgment is probably measured in the same 
way as a deficiency judgment after a judicial sale is calculated and 
would take the same ordinary lien priority as a post-judicial sale defi-
ciency judgment. ISS 
C. Antideficiency Protections 
What is most significant with regard to the allowable deficiency 
judgment is that-when nonprotected parties are involved-it is devoid 
of any of the limitations that restrict such judgments in many jurisdic-
tions. There is no provision for a pre-sale upset-price determination in 
judicial foreclosures, or for a post-sale fair-value or confirmation hear-
ing in either judicial or nonjudicial proceedings.lG1 Nor is there any 
possibility of post-sale redemption to serve as a deterrent or sanction 
against creditor underbidding.lss Indeed, nothing in the Act formally 
prohibits a mortgagee, holding security worth significantly more than 
the debt, from making a privately negotiated nonjudicial foreclosure 
sale of it for significantly less than the debt and then obtaining a defi-
ciency judgment for the difference. Only the pre-sale public notice pro-
visions stand between mortgagors and such horror stories.loa Legislators 
165. Comment 4 to § 501 repeats that the "subsequent action on the debt is controlled by this 
part primarily to protect the policy of restricting deficiency judgments, and to prevent double 
recovery." 
166. See discussion supra parts VIlI.A.-B. 
167. The only indication that the Commissioners were concerned with \-aluation problems is 
the final sentence of § 511 (b), which provides: "For purposes of calculating the amount or a 
deficiency a transfer of the real estate to a person who is liable to the creditor under a guaranty, 
endorsement, repurchase agreement, or the like, is not a sale." See a/so ULSIA § 511 emt. 3. 
Every other kind of transaction, therefore, is a sale and establishes the amount or the deficiency 
judgment. 
168. ULSIA § 513 cmt. 1. 
169. In comment 2 to § 511, the Commissioners observe: "By eliminating deficiency judg-
ments against protected parties, this Act also eliminates one of the primary reasons for judicial 
supervision of the foreclosure process, because the borrower need not be concerned \\ith the ade-
quacy of the purchase price paid at the foreclosure sale." That logic should apply \\ith equal force 
to general debtors who, because they are subject to deficiency liability, need the protection or 
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long familiar with the underbidding that characterizes public foreclo-
sure sales, judicial or nonjudicial, may find the requirement of reasona-
bleness too dubious a protection. 
D. Protected Parties 
In contrast to the disregard of non protected parties, protected par-
ties are given broad insulation against deficiency liability. Section 
511 (b) provides that where the debtor is a protected party and the "ob-
ligation secured is a purchase-money security interest, there is no liabil-
ity for a deficiency, notwithstanding any agreement of the protected 
party."170 The protected party in this case is safeguarded against both 
a post-foreclosure, sale-deficiency judgment and a pre-sale or indepen-
dent-money judgment on his note.l7l It is truly a security-only situation 
with regard to purchase money protected parties. 
One may quarrel with the general notion of extending such broad 
protection to one class of mortgagors while denying any protection to 
all others. Charity to one group does not offset harshness to another. 
The protection given to consumer-purchasers may defuse political op-
postion to the Act, but the dramatic difference in treatment of other 
mortgagors warrants serious examination. 
Such differential treatment may also make some distinctions seem 
arbitrary. The homeowner who puts $1 million of acquisition debt on 
his mansion is given greater protection than the one who refinances his 
$100,000 house in order to send his children to college. If refinancing 
truly eliminates purchase-money status as the Commissioners be-
lieve,172 it would not be hard for lenders to move their loans from one 
category to the other when the need arises.173 There is also the philo-
judicial supervision to guard against underbidding, but instead do not even have the protection of 
a public auction sale. 
170. See § 111(18) for the definition of "purchase money security interest." The Commission· 
ers believe that their definition of purchase money is so broad as to outlaw virtually all deficiency 
judgments. See id. § 511 cmt. 2. 
171. See id. § SOl cmt. 4. With regard to these protected parties, the Commissioners justify 
nonjudicial foreclosure on the ground that the insulation from personal liability makes them indif· 
ferent to the consequences of price inadequacy at the foreclosure sale. See id. § 5 II cmt. 2. This is 
certainly true where the property has a value equal to or below the debt, but would be subject to 
diff~rent considerations where it may have a value in excess of the ,debt and the private sale 
technique is used to avoid generating the deserved surplus to the mortgagor or to juniors. 
172. See id. § 511 cmt. 2. 
173. Section 5 II (b) states that the protection is nonwaivable. However, ingenious money lend. 
ers have never had great difficulty camouflaging their transactions to escape the scrutiny of the 
courts. So long as there is a distinction between the consequences of purchase· and non purchase· 
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sophical question of why homeowners should be protected only with 
regard to their purchase-money loans, which may well be the most dis-
cretionary form of borrowing they ever undertake. Homeowners who 
need to refinance in order to survive a recession when the breadwinner 
has been laid off work may be no less deserving.174 
IX. DEEDS IN LIEU OF FORECLOSURE 
Section 507(a) provides: "After a debtor's default, the secured 
creditor and debtor may agree on an acquisition of the debtor's interest 
in the real estate in lieu of foreclosure." The comments to this section 
indicate that the Commissioners regarded the deed as a third form of 
foreclosure, along with judicial sale and power-of-sale foreclosures.17I1 
Elsewhere in the Act, this is characterized as "a form of strict foreclo-
sure where the secured creditor takes indefeasible title to the land."ns 
A. Unanswered Questions 
The Act is silent on some important questions concerning such 
transactions. First, will a deed in lieu of foreclosure be upheld where it 
is to take effect only in the future-that is, only if the mortgagee does 
not pay his current mortgage obligation by then? Most jurisdictions 
money loans, transactions will be structured to fall on one side or the other of that distinction 
when it is profitable to do so. 
174. There is also the policy question of prohibiting a seller, esp~ially one holding a junior 
mortgage, from recovering a deficiency judgment, after her security has been \\;ptd out by a 
senior sale. At that stage, the politics of loss allocation between seller and buyer raise dilTerent 
issues than are involved when a senior institutional lender seeks money in addition to the property 
it may have already acquired at its own foreclosure sale. 
175. See ULSIA § 507 cmt. 2. A more logical location for this provision would have been in 
§ SOl, entitled "Rights and Remedies," rather than in § 507, which covers "Methods of Foreclo-
sure and Notice." A deed in lieu of foreclosure may be regarded as a possible remedy for a 
mortgagee, but it should not be considered a method of foreclosure. Furthermore, such an ar-
rangement between mortgagor and mortgagee need not wait until "after a debtor's default," as 
the section seems to imply. A pre-default conveyance from the mortgagor to mortgagee is more 
likely to be upheld than is a post-default one, since there is less necessitousness invoh'ed, and it is 
therefore less likely that the mortgagor is merely bargaining for more time. Indeed, the Commis-
sioners may have intended to say that a deed in lieu of foreclosure is \Ollid e\'en if it is e."(ecuted 
after default. But see id, § 513 cmt. 3. 
If the Commissioners instead intended only to prohibit the deed in lieu whicb was executed at 
tbe same moment as the mortgage (the contemporaneous deed), then they should have pro~ided 
that a deed to the mortgagee is valid so long as given any time after the mortgage was executed 
(regardless of whether a default bad occurred), and located tbe provision outside the foreclosure 
section, 
176. [d. § 501 cmt. 6. True strict foreclosure is provided for in § 510(h) to correct mistakes 
made during a previous foreclosure proceeding. See id. § 510 cmt. 8. 
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treat such a deed as a mortgage rather than a deed and do not permit 
the mortgagee to take title according to its terms. Where time is the 
consideration, the mortgagor is not truly selling his property to the 
mortgagee, but continues to regard himself as an owner who can free 
the property from an encumbrance by discharging an obligation; he is a 
mortgagor rather than a grantor. The deed in lieu generally must take 
effect immediately and irrevocably to be treated as a deed rather than 
a mortgage. The failure to qualify what kind of deed is covered in this 
section makes it impossible to tell whether the Act preserves the major-
ity rule or instead adopts the minority rule, which does uphold execu-
tory deeds in lieu of foreclosure.I77 
Related to this issue is the question of whether the debt must be 
cancelled as part of the deed in lieu of a foreclosure transaction. Such 
an arrangement is customary, often done in order to ward off any infer-
ence that an executory transaction exists. Once title has passed to the 
mortgagee, foreclosure remedies are gone, but the Act does not clarify 
whether the deed in lieu has the effect of automatically eliminating 
further monetary relief, or whether that is true only if the parties so 
provide. 
Another set of unanswered questions arises regarding the effect on 
a junior creditor of a deed in lieu of foreclosure. Is it the same as a 
deed delivered to the purchaser at a foreclosure sale, wiping the junior 
out, or is it the equivalent of a mortgagor's deed to a third party, pass-
ing title subject to the junior encumbrance? Generally, a senior mort-
gagee rejects offers of a deed in lieu unless a title search reveals the 
absence of any junior liens, because of the risk that the doctrine of 
merger will lead to its holding title subject to the junior lien. Absent a 
clearer pronouncement on this matter, it is unlikely that lenders in 
ULSIA jurisdictions will be inclined to accept deeds in lieu of foreclo-
sure from their borrowers whenever juniors are in the picture. 
X. POST-SALE MATTERS: COMPLIANCE AND NONCOMPLIANCE 
After the sale is concluded the mortgagee or person who con-
ducted the sale has two remaining tasks: (1) distribution of the pro-
ceeds; and (2) transfer of title to the purchaser. Section 511 (a) governs 
distribution of the proceeds and applies entirely standard principles to 
that function: money is used successively to pay sale expenses, pre-sale 
177. A puzzling sentence appears in § 507 cmt. 6 and adds to the confusion: "Later sections 
concerning notice of sale and intention to take title in satisfaction of the debt require notice to 
junior Iienors whose interest -in the collateral would be cut off by foreclosure." 
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expenses (including the cost of obtaining possession, maintenance, and 
attorneys' fees),178 the debt, junior debts, and finally, if there is any 
left, the debtor. 
A. The Foreclosure Deed 
With regard to transferring title, the person conducting the sale is 
to execute an appropriate deed. Section 512(b) provides: "Signature 
and title or authority of the person signing the deed as grantor and a 
recital of the fact of default and the giving of notices required by this is 
sufficient proof of the facts recited and the signer's authority to sign." 
The Commissioners comment that this was "intended to eliminate the 
necessity of a rigorous examination to determine whether the foreclo-
sure transaction complies with the statutory requirements in meticulous 
detail . . . to further assure that the sale price at the foreclosure sale 
will be more closely related to the real market value of the prop-
erty."179 This policy is carried further by section 512(a), which adds 
that a purchaser for value in good faith takes good title even though 
the seller "fails to comply with the requirements of this Part on default 
or of any judicial sale proceeding." 
There are some matters needing clarification. Is the bona fide pur-
chaser protected even without recitals of compliance in the foreclosure 
deed or is their absence a ground for putting him on notice, and there-
fore not in good faith? Is the selling mortgagee a bona fide purchaser 
on the ground that cancellation of its debt was the equivalent of pay-
ment of value? If not, is a sale to it voidable when defective, even 
though invalidation is not mentioned in the list of remedies included in 
section 514?180 
The scope of the recitals is not entirely clear either, since those 
mentioned relate only to "the fact of default and the giving of notices," 
which are only parts of the entire foreclosure sale process. There is no 
recital that the sale itself was conducted in compliance with the Act or 
the notices, which might permit an attack based on noncompliance as 
178. Attorneys' fees are included "to the extent provided for in the agreement and not prohib-
ited by law." ULSIA § 511(a). This language differs from the references to attorneys' fees in 
other sections. See, e.g., id. §§ 513(a) & (b)(3). 
179. [d. § 512 cmt. 1. 
180. There is a puzzling sentence at the end of § 512(b): "Further proof of the signer's au-
thority is not required even though the signer is also named as grantee of the deed." Since this 
seems to refer to cases where the mortgagee is the purchaser at the foreclosure sale, this reference 
to the signature but not the recitals by the seller should indicate that those recitals do not help the 
mortgagee/purchaser. Perhaps they are to help the party who later purchases from the mortgagee. 
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to those features. The validating provisions of section 512(a) do not 
completely insulate the sale, since they too have limited scope. Al-
though section 512(a) begins by referring to a sale under a power-of-
sale or a judicial sale, it closes by protecting the purchaser only where 
the seller fails to comply with the statutory requirements "on default or 
of any judicial sale proceeding," thus omitting noncompliance with the 
power-of-sale requirements included in the Act,181 Finally, section 
512(c) provides that a regularly conducted noncollusive transfer under 
a foreclosure sale "is not a fraudulent transfer even though the value 
given is less than" the mortgagor's equity in the collateral.182 
A true policy question is presented as to whether it is desirable to 
give sales such immunity. Finality is appropriate for judicial foreclo-
sure sales, where the mortgagee has had ample pre-sale opportunities to 
assert defenses. The power-of-sale process gives the mortgagor such an 
opportunity only in the negative sense, in that the mandatory delays 
following his receipt of notice of intention to foreclose give him time to 
employ an attorney and sue to enjoin the sale. But where' notice is not 
received, even that opportunity is wanting. On the other hand, so long 
as potential purchasers at foreclosure sales must anticipate potentially 
successful attacks on their titles, they will be inclined to bid less, to the 
ultimate detriment of mortgagors as ,well as mortgagees. Whether a 
speedy and conclusive sale is in the long-term best interests of the 
mortgagor class is a political decision legislatures will confront. 
Absent from the section is any reference to putting the purchaser 
into possession. An order compelling delivery of possession to the pur-
chaser at a judicial foreclosure sale, made available by section 510(g), 
is not provided for in this section.183 A separate possessory action must 
be filed where the former mortgagor refuses to leave, but its contours 
will be determined by state law rather than ULSIA. 
B. Noncompliance by the Mortgagee 
Section 514 deals with improper sales. Since judicial foreclosure 
proceedings are already under court supervision, the protection of this 
181. This result is somewhat buttressed by the provision in § 507(0, which provides that fail-
ure to send the notice of intention to foreclose to a deserving party does not invalidate it with 
regard to those who did receive it. 
182. This candid attempt to avoid the consequences of Durrett v Washington National Insur-
ance Co., 621 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1980), is discussed in another paper. See Krasnowiecki, slIpra 
note 137. 
183. And the pre-sale possession sections, covered later, relate only to a creditor, not a foreclo-
sure purchaser. 
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section is confined, as a practical matter, to nonjudicial sales. Section 
514(a) gives the debtor and all other affected parties the right to have 
the sale enjoined if they can show: (1) the debt was invalid; (2) it was 
not in default; (3) the mortgagee was not complying with the statutory 
foreclosure procedures; or (4) the sale proceeds were being misap-
plied.1M This list fairly exhausts the possible delicts by the mortgagee, 
although a catch-all section permitting a party to enjoin on any other 
grounds that would render a sale invalid would also help.lsli 
The nature of the pre-sale relief is not described. Section 514(a) 
provides merely that "[a] sale or disposition of proceeds may be or-
dered or restrained on terms and conditions determined by the court." 
The rest is left to conventional state law, since no special procedures 
are prescribed. Nor does the section prescribe what effect the lifting of 
any injunction will have-whether the clock is reset or is restarted 
from where it was stopped.1ss Where the injunctive period has gone 
beyond the originally scheduled sale date, a new notice of sale seems 
required, but it is arguable whether the notice must use a date five 
weeks hence. 
Finally, injunctive relief is made available to the junior creditor as 
well as to the mortgagor. Because her interest is strictly monetary, it is 
unclear whether the Commissioners intended to provide that equitable 
relief would lie only in extraordinary cases, or whether they intended to 
make the injunction a standard remedy for a junior. 
C. Damages 
The balance of section 514 deals with monetary relief for parties 
aggrieved by an improper foreclosure sale. Section 514(b) states the 
general rule that any party entitled to notice "may recover from the 
creditor any loss caused by a failure to comply with this Part." For the 
mortgagor, this should mean recovery of up to the amount of his equity 
in the property; for the junior, it should mean recovery of her lost jun-
ior lien, limited by the equity in the property after the senior lien. Of 
course, any plaintiff will be required to show that the noncompliance 
184. Except for protected parties, some defenses can be waived in advance by the mortgagor 
as against a holder in due course. See ULSIA § 206(e) & cmt. S. 
185. For instance, the following defenses mayor may not be included in ULSlA: imlllidity of 
the mortgage (versus the obligation), waiver, fraud, and improper claim of priority (asserted by a 
junior lienor). 
186. Conceivably, a court can even treat the clock as having never stopped in the first place, 
where a temporary restraining order was granted and lifted in the middle of the five-week notice-
of-sale period. 
1050 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24:1001 
was a proximate cause of the loss. 
Two further subsections govern special remedies of protected party 
mortgagors.187 Section 514(c) awards the protected party a "statutory 
penalty" of one percent of the "initial unpaid obligation"188 up to $500 
against a mortgagee who "violates this Part." The award is to be made 
"without proof of actual damages" and without reduction for any obli-
gation owed by the mortgagor to the mortgagee. Because this subsec-
tion does not include a list of improprieties as does subsection (a), any 
violation is thus a candidate for the penalty. Furthermore, the penalty 
appears nondiscretionary as to amount; even an innocent transgression 
leads to a $500 award.189 
Finally, section 514(d) also awards the protected party attorney's 
fees "in a judicial proceeding under this section." As written, the 
award seems independent of whether the protected party wins or loses, 
but that interpretation is unlikely.190 The Act does not award attorney's 
fees to the mortgagee in this situation, even if it prevails, but there is 
probably an attorney's fees clause in the mortgage doing SO.191 
XI. RENTS AND POSSESSION 
In its definitions section, ULSIA states that "'Real Estate' in-
cludes rents."192 With regard to the capture of rents, this sets the Act 
on an entirely different course than the one with which most mortgage 
lawyers are familiar. Elsewhere in this country, rents are usually not 
regarded as part of the ordinary security included in a mortgage unless 
there is special language in the document.193 Under ULSIA, however, 
187. It should also be noted that waivers of defenses by a protected party when a second 
mortgage is involved are invalid even if the promissory note was negotiable and was transferred to 
a holder in due course. See ULSIA § 206(d) & cmt. 4. ' 
188. The phrase is confusing. The initial obligation is clearly the amount originally loanedj the 
unpaid obligation usually refers to the amount yet owing. Thus, the "initial unpaid obligation" 
could be either. 
189. Where real damages are involved, the mortgagor must proceed under § 514(b). 
190. Comment 3 to § 514 refers to awarding such fees only to a protected party "whose land 
has been sold in violation of Part 5." ULSIA § 514 cmt. 3. 
19!. The Act does not uniformly assume such clauses are valid or necessary for the recovery 
of that item. Section 511 (a) lets the mortgagee pay itself attorney's fees out of the sale proceeds 
only if it has a clause which is valid under state law. But §§ 513(a) and (b) permit the mortgagee 
to demand such fees as a cost of curing a default even without an attorney's fees clause. 
192. ULSIA § 111(20). 
193. In a lien jurisdiction, there is no right to rents except by way of an assignment of rents 
clause, separately pledging the rents to the mortgagee as additional security over and above the 
title. In a title jurisdiction, the mortgagee may demand rents from tenants, not because the rents 
are part of its security, but because its mortgage entitles it to possession and it may therefore 
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"rents are part of the security unless excluded by the security 
agreement. "194 
The inclusion of rents is meaningful to a mortgagee only if it can 
get to them, and that consequence does not follow automatically from 
the recharacterization of rents as part of the security. Just as the mort-
gagee cannot automatically reach out and take the mortgagor's title to 
the real estate, so also it does not automatically have the right to seize 
the rents.195 The right to get them is provided for in section 505(a): 
"Mter a debtor's default, a secured creditor in possession of the real 
estate and any creditor who has an assignment of rents, even though 
not in possession, may notify a lessee to make payments of the rents to 
that creditor .... " Thus the mortgagee actually obtains the rents ei-
ther by going into possession or by having an assignment of rents from 
the mortgagor.19G 
The role of an assignment of rents clause is best understood by 
first analyzing how rents relate to possession. 
A. Possession 
Section 503(b) provides that, except as against resident protected 
parties, "a secured creditor, on the debtor's default, may take posses-
sion of the real estate." It thus tracks title theory rather than lien the-
threaten to assert that possessory right against junior tenants unless they pay rent to it. 
Only rents from senior tenants in title states may be regarded as automatically p3rt of the 
mortgage security, because a mortgage executed after a lease is regarded as transferring the re-
version-along with the right to rents-to the mortgagee. 
Rents are not regarded as ordinary personal property proceeds governed by the Uniform 
Commercial Code. U.C.C. § 9-1040) (1982). Part of the reason for reclassifying rents was to 
have the real estate rules of priority and recording apply to them, lest they otherwise fall between 
the cracks of the two Acts. See ULSIA § 102 cmt. 2. 
194. Id. § 210 cmt. 3. 
195. Whether or not this constitutes sufficient perfection of the right to rents as to prC\-ail as 
against a bankruptcy trustee is covered in a separate article in this issue of the Connecticut Law 
Review. See Krasnowiecki, supra note 137. 
196. A creditor desiring an assignment of leases or of rents as independent security, unrelated 
to the possibility of default on loan payments by the debtor, would take an "assignment of rents" 
from the debtor and instantly notify the tenants of that fact, just as a creditor does now \\ithout 
ULSIA. See ULSIA § 102 cmL 2. The difference is that a clause like that is necessary in a non-
ULSIA state in order to give the mortgagee any interest at all in the rents, whereas ULSIA gives 
the mortgagee an interest in them, but one which may be unenforceable v.ithout such a clause. 
Since the alternative route to rents-going into possession-is permitted only "after default:' the 
creditor desiring an absolute assignment of rents independent of default has no choice but to have 
an assignment clause. The mortgagee who wants to reach the rents after default may impro-.e its 
position by having a clause, but it is not indispensable since there is the alternative of possession. 
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ory with regard to the question of pre-sale possession.197 The Commis-
sioners state that the right to possession arises "from the existence of 
the security agreement. Neither a clause in the security agreement nor 
title in the creditor is a prerequisite."19s Thus, one way for a mortgagee 
to reach rents is to take possession under section 503(b) and then notify 
the tenants to pay future rents to it, pursuant to section 505(a).19D 
Absent any special clauses in the mortgage, a mortgagee, "on the 
debtor's default, may take possession of the real estate by judicial pro-
ceeding."20o The nature of the judicial proceeding is not described. 
Since it is not a proceeding to obtain true possession of the prop-
erty-otherwise tenants would be dispossessed and not likely to con-
tinue paying rent-ejectment seems inappropriate.201 Furthermore, a 
conventional ejectment action would probably take too long, although a 
somewhat leisurely proceeding does seem contemplated by the Com-
missioners, in light of the provision in section 503(d) stating that "[i]n 
a judicial proceeding to remove the debtor from possession before ter-
mination of the debtor's interest, the debtor may assert claims and de-
fenses against the secured creditor, including a claim that there has 
been no default." Summary dispossession proceedings are apparently 
not intended by this section.202 
What saves the mortgagee from this obviously inept way to get 
rents is that ULSIA permits an alternative route to possession through 
the use of a "possession clause."203 
197. Because the mortgagee is not entitled to possession until after default. it is more accu-
rately an intermediate theory treatment of possession. 
198. ULSIA § 503 cmt. 2. However, the comment does not explain how or why the existence 
of the security agreement generates a right to possesion. Rents were included within the definition 
of the security in § I I I (20), but possession was not. It would probably be better to say that the 
right to possesion arises from § 503(b). rather than from the security agreement. 
199. In § 210 cmt. 3, the Commissioners state that rents may be reached by taking possession 
on default even if the security agreement excluded rents from the security! The language of the 
Act does not categorically refute such interpretation, but does make one wonder just what the 
parties must say if they really intend to exclude rents from the reach of the mortgagee. 
200. ULSIA § 503(b). 
201. In § 207 cmt. I, the Commissioners state that "the right to take possession is basically a 
right to manage the collateral and to collect rent of the lessee who cannot be ousted." Although 
the Commissioners would limit that observation to senior tenants. it appears applicable to junior 
tenants as well prior to the final foreclosure sale. 
202. This same problem also exists with regard to post-sale possession whenever a nonjudicial 
foreclosure sale is involved. 
203. The phrase is mine; I also refer to it as a "possession provision." 
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1. Possession Clauses 
Section 503(a) states: "[I]f the security agreement provides that 
the secured creditor may take possesion without judicial proceeding, 
the secured creditor, on the debtor's default, may take possession if the 
secured creditor can do so without breaching the peace." There is no 
direct statutory authorization or description of such a mortgage provi-
sion, leaving drafters to their own devices in terms of creating one/zo.c 
There are clear advantages in having a possession provision in the 
mortgage. The right to self-help provided by the clause both reduces 
litigation costs and substantively improves the mortgagee's position, 
since self-help possession is not subject to mortgagor defenses/lOG This 
advantage is considerably offset, however, by the fact that self-help is 
permissible only when it can be done peacefully, which is an unlikely 
situation when the mortgagor believes that he has defenses to the 
foreclosure.2 06 
2. Restrictions on Possession 
With regard to both possession provisions and actions for posses-
sion, protected parties and their relatives actually occupying their resi-
dences are safe and may not be ''dispossessed.''207 In this situation, lien 
theory applies and preserves a mortgagor's possessory rights until after 
the foreclosure sale, except in emergency situations. Insofar as posses-
sion is sought as a prerequisite to collecting rents, nothing has been 
lost, since in most cases a mortgagor cannot be charged for his own 
possession anyway. 
Nonresident protected parties are not given that same security, but 
their possession of the property is good against all junior mortgagees; 
only the senior mortgagee may obtain pre-sale possession of protected 
204. Such a provision is also described in § S03(c) as "a provision in a security agreement 
giving the secured creditor the right to take possession without judicial proceeding." 
205. A provision that recites, for example, that "[u)pon default (as defined) the creditor may 
take possession without the need for a judicial proceeding" should suffice. 
206. The Commissioners did desire to minimize collection costs. Thus, they obsen-e in com-
ment 1 to § 503: "This Act is based on a major policy decision-to reduce the 'cost' of foreclo-
sure. A provision giving the creditor the right to take possession after default \~ithout the inten-en-
tion of the expensive receivership process is one step in carrying out this policy." On the other 
hand, in comment 2 to § 503, they seem to recognize that the self-help remedy "ill prob:lblyonly 
be of importance in cases of abandoned property. It is hardly surprising that the drive for econ-
omy had to give way to the public policy against breaches of the peace. 
207. ULSIA § S03(c). The unoccupied balance of a protected party's property is not immune 
from pre-sale possession by the mortgagee. See id. § 503 cmt. 1. 
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party property.208 
The senior mortgagee also has a priority right to possession as 
against junior mortgagees. Section 503(e) provides that "the secured 
creditor whose interest has priority also has priority of right to take 
possession." As explained in comment 3 to section 505, this means that 
a later action by the senior mortgagee for possession will displace a 
prior possession of the junior mortgagee, even though it was first law-
fully obtained. 
The possession of tenants is also protected until after the foreclo-
sure sale,209 a matter considered later.21o 
B. Rents via Possession 
The notion of reaching the rents by way of taking possession 
harkens back to an earlier time, before the drawbacks of being a 
"mortgagee in 'possession"211 led mortgagees to seek the more attractive 
alternative of receivership. The drafters of ULSIA do not share modern 
lenders' aversion to taking possession of defaulted property. It is their 
belief that the utilization of receivers to collect rents and manage the 
property during the default period is costly and unnecessary, and that 
it is preferable for the mortgagee itself to do so instead.212 Thus they 
have drafted provisions making the appointment of a receiver difficult 
and making mortgagee in possession status more tolerable. 
With regard to receiverships, section 504 confines that remedy to 
situations where there is a "showing that a secured creditor cannot take 
possession or that possession by a secured creditor will not adequately 
take into account the interests of persons haying a claim to the real 
208. Id. § 503(e). Comment I to this section provides that "[the] restriction on rights of 
junior secured parties applies to all protected party cases, whether or not the protected party is in 
possesion." However, comment 2 states, "[T]he restriction on the use of the self-help remedy as to 
protected parties applies only as to protected parties ... who reside on the property. Therefore, if 
the security agreement contains a clause permitting self-help, self-help is available as to aban-
doned protected party real estate." The net effect appears to be that a junior creditor cannot get 
pre-sale possession of protected party real estate even though she has a possession clause in her 
mortgage and the property has been abandoned by the mortgagor. 
No explanation is given for the different treatment given to senior and junior mortgagees with 
regard to pre-sale possession. Perhaps the Commissioners were familiar with cases of abuse involv-
ing junior creditors. 
209. See ULSIA § 503(0 & cmt. 4. 
210. See discussion infra part XI.E. 
211. See id. § 505 cmt. 1. 
212. "[E)conomic self interest of the secured creditor under a defaulted mortgage ought to 
lead him to prefer to control matters himself or with 'experts' selected by him rather than by a 
judge from a list which mayor may not be based on competence in managing real estate." Id. 
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estate involved." The comments to this section reveal a strongly held 
belief by the Commissioners that receivership should once again be-
come an extraordinary and unusual remedy. 
With regard to the mortgagee taking possession, section 505--the 
leng.thiest operational section in the entire Act-describes the situation 
in minute detaipl3 It is its purpose, according to comment 1, "to spell 
out the duties of a mortgagee in possession so that they are less severe 
and more certain and do not discourage the mortgagee taking posses-
-sion." To dispel the worries of the mortgagee, section 505(c) requires 
that it manage the property as a "prudent person, taking into account 
the effect of ... management on the interest of the debtor,"lIH but that 
if it delegates the managerial functions to a professional real estate 
manager who is independent, financially responsible and prudently se-
lected, it has thereby satisfied its own obligation of prudent manage-
ment.lIlt; Thereafter, duties are specified with regard to insurance, 
maintenance, repairs, code-mandated improvements, and payment of 
expenses.216 Finally, section 505 insulates the mortgagee from responsi-
bility for accidental loss or liability to third parties if it carried appro-
priate insurance.217 
With regard to powers of the mortgagee in possession, section 
503(b) permits it to execute leases which may outlast the mortgagee's 
possession of the premises-and even survive the foreclosure sale in 
some cases218-if the terms of those leases are reasonable and custom-
213. This same sort of detail would have significantly improved ULSIA's CO\'erage of foreclo-
sure sales. 
214. The Commissioners state that this requirement does not make the mortgagee "accounta-
ble for the rental value of vacant units in a building held for rental if he used reasonable diligence 
to obtain new tenants." Id. § 50S cmt. S. If the section does accomplish this glXll, it makes the 
mortgagee considerably better off than a traditional mortgagee in possession. 
215. See id. § SOS(d). According to comment 5 to this section, some of these duties are more 
stringent than the simple prudent person standard of § SOS(c). 
ACREL approved of § 50S (c) and referred in general to these sections as prO\iding "an 
improved and viable procedure for the management of defaulted properties by limiting the liabil-
ity of creditors in possession." ACREL REPORT, supra note 8, at 12. 
216. The requirement that the management agent be financially independent was a feature 
which ACREL found objectionable. Its study committee contended that lending institutions which 
had "acquired independent well known and financially stable management firms as subsidiaries" 
should not be treated as out of compliance with the Act. ACREL REpORT, supra note 8, at 14. 
The only other objection made by the committee went to the optional prohibition of a prep3yment 
penalty after acceleration by the creditor. See id. at 11 (referring to ULSlA § S02(b». Ap3rt 
from that, the committee supported the adoption of ULSlA. See Id. at 18. 
217. ULSIA § SOS(g). 
218. Section SOS(b) states: "A creditor in possession may execute leases ••• extending b1:yond 
the time of the creditor's possession which have the same priority as if made by the owner of the 
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ary. Thus, where the mortgagee believes that the mortgagor has been 
mismanaging the property, the right to take possession is intended to 
give it power to wrest managerial control away from the mortgagor.210 
With respect to disposition of the income from the property, sec-
tion 505(h) directs the mortgagee to apply it to expenses220 and then 
(1) to senior liens;221 (2) to the mortgage in default; and finally (3) "to 
the persons who but for the creditor's taking possession would have 
been entitled to the moneys." Difficulties arise with regard to the pay-
ment of senior (1) and inferior (3) interests. The section appears to 
contemplate the ongoing disposition of currently collected rents, rather 
than an ultimate disposition of all of the rent that was accumulated 
between the date of entry and the completion of the foreclosure sale. 
Under those circumstances, there should be no need to apply the rents 
towards senior lienors who have not asserted their rights to possession 
under their own rents clauses. The property will be sold subject to such 
interests, and they should be paid only if the mortgagee in possession 
prefers to do so in order to avoid triggering a senior foreclosure. With 
regard to distributing surplus rents to the mortgagor, it is difficult to 
see how that can happen. The obligation in default has been acceler-
ated, meaning that there should be no comparison between the rents 
collected and the installment payments due in any given period.222 Only 
in the relatively inconceivable situation where the current rents col-
lected exceeded the entire balance due under the accelerated mortgage 
would such a residual disposition be made. 
Is this new system sufficiently attractive to mortgagees so as to 
real estate." As will be discussed later, residential leases may survive foreclosure, even though 
junior to the mortgage. Thus, a residential lease executed by the mortgagee after the mortgagor 
had defaulted would not be terminated by the foreclosure sale if its terms were reasonable. See 
infra parts XI.C.3-XI.E. Nonresidential leases do not have this survival feature, but the section 
lets them continue if the mortgagor cures his default and avoids foreclosure. 
219. See id. § 505 cmt. 2. 
220. Under § 505(f), the mortgagee is entitled to deduct liability insurance premiums and 
management fees actually paid. It does not appear that a mortgagee who manages the property 
itself can charge for its own time in doing so. 
221. The wording of § 505(h)(I) is quite peculiar: "payment of claims having priority over the 
interest the creditor represents under the laws of the United States and of this State." It could be 
construed as referring only to federal and state tax claims, but the Commissioner's comments 
indicate that all prior liens were intended to be included. See id. § 505 cmt. 10. 
222. An exception, however, applies to a protected party. Even then, one would not expect 
that the mortgagee should be required to turn over the monthly excess to the mortgagor while the 
balance of its debt is outstanding. However, in a case where the use of the rents has worked a 
redemption, this circumstance should cancel the mortgagee's entire right to remain in possession 
thereafter. 
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induce them to lobby to have it replace the current technique of collect-
ing rents through receivers enforcing assignment of rents clauses? Ab-
sence of a receiver will no doubt save some expenses, and a few safe 
harbors have been provided to eliminate some apprehensions lenders 
have about putting themselves into possession. Conversely, there are 
enough general requirements of reasonableness as to caution any mort-
gagee to take responsibility for meaningful decisions concerning the 
property. Finally, and perhaps most significantly, nothing in ULSIA 
protects a mortgagee from being held accountable for environmental 
response costs if the property turns out to be contaminated and the 
mortgagee is held to be an owner or operator by virtue of having exer-
cised its statutory rights to possession. 
1. Rents Clauses 
For the mortgagee who does not wish to seek possession solely in 
order to reach the rents from the property, ULSIA offers it the alterna-
tive of having an appropriate clause in its mortgage. Tenants may be 
notified to pay their rents to either the mortgagee in possession or to 
"any creditor who has an assignment of rents, even though not in pos-
session."223 As it did with possession clauses, ULSIA assumes the exis-
tence and validity of an "assignment of rents" without directly author-
izing or construing it.224 The fact that the rents are already part of the 
security by virtue of the definition of real estate does not render a 
clause assigning them to the mortgagee superfluous,::!:!!! since they do 
not belong to the mortgagee until an additional step (possession or a 
rents clause) has occurred. The rents clause permits the mortgagee to 
demand rents from the tenants after the mortgagor has defaulted and 
thereby become "entitled to the rents accruing after the receipt of the 
notice."226 
223. 1d. § 505(a). 
:224. Such a provision is referred to in comment 2 to § 50S as "a claim to rents by an 
assignment." 
225. The Commissioners use the term assignment of rents even though they also beliC'o'e tbat 
"[u]nder this Act, rents are automatically assigned to the secured creditor unless the security 
agreement specifically provides that they are not assigned." 1d. § 505 cmt. 2. That sentence 
makes discussion about statutory and contractual assignments of rents as sep:lrate principles con-
fusing, to say the least. 
The references are not to absolute assignment of rent arrangements independent of default. 
See id. § 102(b) & cmt. 2 (treating various forms of rent assignment provisions). See a/so [d. 
§ 204 cmt. 
226. 1d. § 505(a). This assumes that the clause so provides. There could be an unconditional 
assignment of rents taking effect even prior to default or a conditional assignment postponing the 
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There are real advantages in reaching the rents by way of a rents 
clause rather than through possession, even when obtained under a pos-
session clause. The utility of a possession clause depends upon lack of 
resistance by the mortgagor, whereas demand upon the tenants pursu-
ant to a rents clause may be made notwithstanding debtor resistance.227 
Furthermore, the right to rents does not require taking possession by 
self-help, suing for possession, or seeking to have a receiver appointed. 
Indeed, as worded, it appears to let the mortgagee collect and retain 
gross rents rather than being obliged to use any part of them to service 
the property during the foreclosure period.228 Indeed, in such a case the 
mortgagee may be free to disregard all obligations imposed by the lease 
on the mortgagor/landlord.229 For any mortgagee interested only in 
reaching the rents and not seeking any additional control over the prop-
erty, this will be the indisputably preferred alternative.230 For an Act 
premised on the notion that substance should prevail over form,231 the 
fact that a boilerplate clause can work such a difference is surprising. 
A system of priorities interrelating both rent clause and possession 
rights is included in section 505(a). "If more than one secured creditor 
entitled to rents has notified the lessee to make payment, the secured 
creditor in possession has priority or, if no creditor is in possession, the 
secured creditor having priority of secured interest has priority as to 
rents."232 Consequently, a senior mortgagee acting under its rent clause 
will have a lower priority rank than does a junior mortgagee who has 
turnover until some other event. 
227. Section 505 provides for proof to a skeptical tenant of the mortgagee's superior claim to 
the rents. 
228. Comment 2 to § 505 provides that utilization of a rents clause to collect the rents "does 
not result in the creditor taking possession, so the secured creditor as an assignee has no obligation 
to apply the rents to the expenses of property management." 
229. This conclusion was drawn by Professor Randolph with regard to the predecessor Uni-
form Land Transactions Act (ULTA), containing similar provisions. See Randolph, supra note 
10, at 48. Randolph appears to be the only person who looked carefully at what the ULTA would 
do with regard to rents and receivers, and his trenchant criticisms are worth reviewing. See also 
Patrick A. Randolph, Jr., When Should Bankruptcy Courts Recognize Lenders' Rents Interests?, 
23 U.c. DAVIS L. REV. 833 (1990). 
230. Conversely, a mortgagee who wants the right to manage and control the property cannot 
do so through use of a rents clause; a possession clause is far more useful to it for that purpose. 
231. In their introductory comment, the Commissioners say "the traditional distinctions 
among security interests based largely on form or whether the creditor had 'title' to the real estate 
collateral arc not retained .... The rights and duties of creditor and debtor prescribed by this Act, 
however, are made applicable to the transaction regardless of form." ULSIA prefatory note at 7. 
To this observer, making remedies depend on the inclusion or omission of a rents clause docs the 
opposite. 
232. ULSIA § 505(a). This is elaborately worked out in comment 3 to § 505. 
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taken possession, which forces the senior to go into possession itself, if 
only to regain priority over the junior. Under these circumstances, a 
possession clause will do it more good than a rents clause. 
To a mortgagor, the changes proposed by ULSIA regarding rents 
may seem insignificant. In lien states, the mortgagor is theoretically 
entitled to keep rents and possession until the final foreclosure sale, but 
always waives his rights by appropriate clauses in his mortgage. He 
signs a similar clause in title states, in order to let his mortgagee cap-
ture rents without having to take possession. Under ULSIA, his start-
ing position is that the rents are part of the security he has given up 
and are subject to the mortgagee taking possession from him on de-
fault, even without enabling language in his mortgage. But the mortga-
gor will probably find that his mortgage still assigns the rents on de-
fault to the mortgagee and also permits the mortgagee to take 
possession by self-help on default. The clauses will likely be as much a 
part of the boilerplate language as are current rents, profits and receiv-
ership clauses now.233 
C. Other Income Apart from Rents Paid by Tenants 
Other forms of income arising from or in conjunction with the 
property are treated separately from rent. These include income re-
ceived as a substitute for the property and "crops and profits from the 
real estate."234 
1. Substitute Income 
Section 210 provides that "[a] security interest attaches without 
explicit agreement to" (1) damage claims the mortgagor has against 
his seller; (2) condemnation awards; (3) insurance payments; and (4) 
claims against third parties for damage to the collateral. 
Condemnation awards and some damage claims are usually 
treated as replacement property, entitling the mortgagee to go after 
them even without enabling language in its mortgage. On the other 
hand, because an insurance award is the result of a separate contract 
between the mortgagor and his insuror, it would not come under the 
233. Indeed, it is odd that ULSIA requires the mortgagee to include a rents clause in its 
mortgage in order to have a meaningful remedy. Having gone so far as to gh'e the mortgagee a 
basic right to rents without a clause, why was the last, consistent step not also taken-gi~ing the 
mortgagee a statutory right to notify the tenants to pay the rent to it after default \\ith or without 
a clause'? 
234. Id. § 210(c). 
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security of the mortgage unless there was-as there always is-a spe-
cial clause in the mortgage requiring the mortgagor to keep the prop-
erty insured for the benefit of the mortgagee, and assigning the pro-
ceeds therefrom to the mortgagee. Thus, ULSIA works a change with 
regard to monies from the insurance company by automatically includ-
ing them under the security umbrella. 
It is not apparent what the difference is between these income 
items and ordinary rent. Rent is part of the real estate and thus subject 
to a security interest, whereas these items are subject to the creditor's 
security interest although they are not defined as part of the 'real estate. 
The section seems to make utilization of clauses unnecessary, but it 
does not indicate whether in the absence of such clauses a mortgagee 
can reach these funds when there was no default in the mortgage note 
and whether it must take possession in order to do so, as is the case 
with rents absent enabling language.231i Until those questions are re-
solved, mortgagees would be wise to continue including the special pro-
visions currently included in their mortgages dealing with this 
matter.236 
2. Crops and Profits 
Section 203(c) provides: "A security interest in real estate at-
taches to crops and profits from the real estate only if the security 
agreement so provides." Thus these items receive opposite treatment 
from the substitute income items discussed previously, for which the 
security interest attaches "without explicit agreement." However, like 
the substitute income items, crops and profits are intended to be treated 
differently than rents.237 Other than requiring that the mortgage pro-
vide for them, the Act does not provide for any mechanism for collec-
tion of crops or profits, before or after default, and with or without 
235. There is no official comment for this section. 
236. Section 210(b) covers what the mortgagee must show to the payor to have the funds 
directed to it. . 
237. See id. § 210. Comment 3 to § 210 states: 
Subsection (c) states a basic rule to serve as the benchmark of drafting clauses in 
security agreements: The real estate secured creditor, whether he appears to have title or 
not is not entitled to crops or other profits unless his security agreement provides that 
they are additional collateral for the debt; on the other hand, the secured creditor is 
entitled to rents unless his security agreement specifically provides that rents are not part 
of the security. This distinction in the treatment of rents and of crops and profits is based 
upon the belief that such a distinction fits a developing belief of lenders and borrowers as 
to the rights of the lender. 
[d. § 210 cmt. 3. 
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possession. Therefore, the mortgage itself must cover these 
considerations.238 
3. Survival of Leases 
In the United States the effect of a foreclosure action upon ex-
isting leases depends upon a number of variables: (l) whether the lease 
is senior or junior to the mortgage; (2) whether the jurisdiction follows 
lien or title theory; (3) whether the foreclosure is in process or has been 
completed; and (4) whether the mortgage contains an assignment of 
rents clause. 
a. Senior Leases 
Where the lease is senior to the mortgage, the mortgagee has only 
a mortgage on the reversion and is never entitled to terminate the lease. 
It does not matter whether a lien or title theory is involved, or whether 
there has merely been a default or a completed foreclosure. Conversely, 
the senior tenant remains bound by the lease since the foreclosure is an 
irrelevant event with respect to its leasehold (except that if no one per-
forms the landlord's covenants, she may be able to terminate the lease 
under a theory of constructive eviction). 
b. Junior Leases 
Where the lease is junior to the mortgage, it may be terminated by 
a completed foreclosure sale. Again, the jurisdiction does not matter 
since in every state the foreclosure purchaser acquires a complete title 
free of all inferior interests, including leases. On the other hand, a jun-
ior tenant not included in the foreclosure proceeding is not affected by 
it and her interest is therefore not terminated. Thus, intentional exclu-
sion of junior tenants may be used by the mortgagee to preserve eco-
nomically advantageous leases.239 
238. Section 210 makes no distinction between crops and profits and defines neither term. The 
official comments make clarification even more difficult by careless phraseology. For example: 
As between secured creditor and debtor, this section states the rights to rents and profits 
accruing between the making of the mortgage and foreclosure. Prior law gave no clear 
answer to Ihis problem, in part because of the mortgaging of rents and crops apart from 
the land is a late development. Basically prior law attempted to resolve the right of lender 
and debtor to rents and crops by asking who is entitled to possession. 
[d. § 210 cmt. I (emphasis added). Comment 3 refers to "crops or other profits." The pairings 
seem unintentional. 
239. In a nonjudicial sale. where the concept of party jurisdiction is inapplicable, this strategy 
may be more difficult to implement. but a similar outcome may be reached by olTerins to sell only 
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c. Pre-Sale Termination 
Only where pre-sale remedies are sought by the mortgagee does 
the lien/title distinction matter. In lien jurisdictions, there is no right to 
possession prior to the termination of the mortgagor's title through a 
completed foreclosure sale. 'At that point, possession vests in the fore-
closure purchaser, not the mortgagee, unless these happen to be the 
same entity. In title jurisdictions, the mortgagee is entitled to posses-
sion either immediately (pure title theory), or after default (intermedi-
ate theory), even though the foreclosure sale has not yet occurred. 
Under lien theory, therefore, no tenants, whether senior or junior, may 
be divested of possession during the foreclosure process; in title states, 
junior tenants may be dispossessed by entry of the mortgagee.2.40 
d. Pre-Sale Termination and Rents 
In lien states, the absence of any pre-sale possessory rights render 
the mortgagee unable to demand rents from either senior or junior te-
nants. On the other hand, a mortgagee in a title state can indirectly 
reach rents from junior tenants by threatening to assert its paramount 
title rights and evict them if they do not pay their rents to it 
thereafter.241 
If there is an assignment of rents clause in the mortgage, both title 
and lien mortgagees are in a significantly better position. In a title 
state, the clause permits the mortgagee to have a receiver ap-
pointed-which does not constitute a dispossession of the tenant-and 
the rent reserved can be collected even though it is above market.242 In 
a lien state, appointment of a receiver under the assignment of rents 
clause has the same effect and eliminates the difficulties presented by 
the lack of any other pre-sale possessory right in the mortgagee. 
a fraction of the security-the reversion-at the sale. 
240. Such dispossession would constitute an eviction by paramount title. 
241. The entitlement to rents from junior tenants thus arises from the act of not taking posses-
sion, rather than from taking possession, which would entitle the tenants to terminate their leases, 
quit, and cease paying rent due to the eviction. A tenant paying an above market rent might 
decide to ignore the mortgagee's threat to take possession and get herself evicted and her lease-
hold terminated. 
242. If rent reserved is below market, the mortgagee may threaten to take possession and 
thereby terminate the junior lease unless the tenant agrees to pay more. 
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e. ULSIA 
Under ULSIA, outcomes are different. Lien and title distinctions 
no longer matter, but the other distinctions continue to playa role. 
Senior tenants remain unaffected by defaults; neither pre-sale nor com-
pleted foreclosure sales impair their tenancies or their rent liabilities.24s 
However, as to pre-sale termination of junior leases, section 503(0 pro-
vides that the mortgagee may take possession on default, but subject to 
existing leases, even junior ones. Thus, this section gives the mortgagee 
the theoretical right of a title theory creditor to pre-sale possession, but 
simultaneously incorporates lien theory in preserving junior leases until 
the foreclosure process is complete.2H Neither party is free to use the 
event of default as a ground for either terminating the lease or at-
tempting to alter the rent schedule.24G 
Under this arrangement, there is no theoretical need for an assign-
ment of rents clause. The mortgagee is entitled to hold tenants to their 
leases and existing rent charges with or without one. There is also no 
need to have a receiver appointed in order to keep the tenants from 
leaving; a mortgagee taking possession does not thereby disturb or dis-
possess them.246 
D. Post-Sale Termination of Leases 
Regarding this question, ULSIA again takes a new direction. 
While junior leases generally do not survive a completed foreclosure, 
there is an exception in that "a lease of residential real estate made in 
ordinary course by a debtor in possession of collateral is effective 
243. ULSIA § S03(f). This section technically only relates to pre·sale possession, but there is 
no language anywhere in the Act that would change the common law priority of senior tenants 
over junior foreclosure purchasers. 
244. Comment 4 to § 503 states: "Protection of the debtor's right to redeem requires that the 
creditor cannot disturb his leases until the right to redeem is extinguished." Section S03(f) also 
contains an exception for terminating a junior lease in order to avoid deterioration or destruction. 
245. Comment 1 to § 207 seemingly contradicts this conclusion: 
If under priority rules the lease between a debtor as landlord and a tenant is su~rior to 
the security interest, the right to take possession is basically a right to manage the collat-
eral and to collect rent of the lessee who cannot be ousted. See sections 210 and SOS as to 
the right to collect rents. If the lease is junior to the security interest then the present 
section is applicable. Under subsection (a) the creditor may exercise his possessory right 
by ousting the lessee. 
Insofar as this comment suggests that a junior tenant may be evicted before a foreclosure sale. it 
is incorrect in light of § S03(f). Prior to a completed foreclosure. the right to possession as against 
both senior and junior tenants is merely a right to collect the rents and manage the pro~rty. 
246. There may, however, be significant practical advantages in utilizing a rents clause or in 
having a receiver appointed. See discussion supra parts XI.B.I-XI.C.3. 
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against the secured creditor for not more than two years after the date 
of the lease," provided it sets a reasonable rent, has no significant pre-
paid rent arrangement, permits the landlord to re-enter on default, and 
grants the tenant prompt possession.247 Such a rule gives residential 
tenants the kind of protection against senior mortgage foreclosures that 
they usually have only in rent- control jurisdictions.248 Since almost all 
residential leases automatically subordinate the tenants to future mort-
gages, this provision is a very significant and beneficial one to them.240 
Except for this special case, junior leases are destroyed on foreclosure. 
Section 207(a) provides: 
[AJ tenant under a lease executed by the debtor after a secur-
ity interest in the real estate has been perfected or under a 
lease that has been subordinated thereto by written agreement 
of the tenant has no greater right to remain in possession 
under the lease term than has the debtor.2GO 
E. Foreclosing Against Junior Tenants 
The questions of whether a mortgagee may avoid terminating a 
junior lease, or how it should proceed against a junior tenant where it 
wishes to end her tenancy, are not explicitly treated by ULSIA. As a 
possessor of the property, such a tenant is entitled to request receipt of 
any notice of intention to foreclose.2G1 The failure to give her such no-
tice may have the effect of leaving her interest unaffected by the subse-
247. ULSIA § 207(b). The Commissioners observe that such leases should be treated as chat-
tels purchased by consumers from merchants and protected against creditor claims under princi-
ples analogous to U.C.C. § 9-307(1). See id. § 207 cmt. 2. 
248. Section 505(b) provides: "A creditor in possession may execute leases ... extending 
beyond the time of the creditor's possession which have the same priority as if made by the owner 
of the real estate." But this provision does not have the same survival effect because junior non-
residential leases by a mortgagor do not outlive a senior foreclosure sale. See ULSIA § 207(a). 
Comment 4 to § 505, however, seems to ignore this rule by saying that a three-year lease in an 
apartment building would endure its entire term when made by a mortgagee in possession. This 
would follow only if the lease executed by a mortgagee in possession had the priority of a senior 
lease, and the Commissioners have nowhere indicated that they intended the mortgagee in posses-
sion to have such powers. 
249. Requisite offsetting protection for the mortgagee is given in other subsections invalidating 
options to renew and purchase and exempting debtor bankruptcy proceedings from the application 
of § 207. 
250. The language of this section is peculiar. In fact, the landlord/debtor has no right at all to 
remain in possession "under the lease term," and the section would read more clearly if those four 
words were omitted. 
A complementary arrangement validating nondisturbance agreements is found in § 207(e). 
251. See ULSIA § 507(f). 
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quent sale, but this scenario does not explain the effect of non-notice to 
her if she has not requested it in the first place. She is also a proper 
party to be included in a judicial foreclosure proceeding,21!2 whether or 
not she requested notice of intention to foreclose, so long as her lease 
was recorded, and failure to serve her should again leave her tenancy 
unaffected. However, where her lease was not recorded, non-inclusion 
should not equal nontermination of her lease under the Act as worded. 
Most significantly, the validating language of section 512(a) mayelimi-
nate the junior tenant even when the foreclosure proceedings were defi-
nitely defective as to her.2t13 If so, it would only be by describing the 
collateral as a reversion subject to junior leases, rather than the entire 
fee originally mortgaged, that a mortgagee could preserve for its fore-
closure purchaser the junior lease on the property. 
Where the junior tenant is notified or served, it is not clear that 
there is anything she can do to stop the foreclosure. Sections 513(a) 
and 513(e) confer rights of redemption only on the mortgagor and "the 
holder of any subordinate security interest." There is no reference to 
the holders of subordinate interests in the collateral which are not se-
curity interests. Successors of the mortgagor may redeem only if that 
right has been released or assigned to them.2M Where the sale has been 
completed, the junior tenant who fails to quit may be made subject to a 
possession order if the foreclosure was judiciaUlll1l 
XII. CONCLUSION 
The precondition for the political success of any proposed uniform 
law is recognition that the old system needs overhaul. This need cer-
tainly seems true for mortgage law in this country. Lenders, borrowers 
and their attorneys frequently complain of the complexity of both mak-
ing mortgage loans at the outset and collecting on them when they be-
come delinquent. Mortgage documents and mortgage foreclosures are 
too lengthy, complicated by unintelligible provisions and procedures, 
and generally overencumbered by restrictive state laws. 
252. See id. § 510(c). 
253. Section 512(a) states: 
[A] purchaser for value in good faith acquires the debtor's and creditor's rights in the 
real estate, free of the security interest under which the sale occurred and any 
subordinate interest, even though the creditor or person conducting the sale fails to com-
ply with the requirements of this Part on default or of any judicial sale proceeding. 
254. See ULSIA § 513(d). 
255. See id. § 510(g). The fact that it is unclear which procedure the purchaser at a nonjudi-
cial sale must follow has already been discussed. See discussion supra p3rt VII. 
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But a proposed reform act, especially a uniform one, cannot suc-
ceed by merely pointing to the deficienCies of the present system. Such 
an act should offer tangible improvements making the law, the docu-
ments, and the collection process simpler, more understandable, more 
efficient, fairer, and more consistent. I cannot conclude that ULSIA 
offers this help.21S6 
A. Simplicity 
The new concepts ULSIA introduces often add rather than reduce 
complexity. The redefinition of default, for instance, may well force at-
torneys to invent new words and rules for nondefault nonperformance 
and force mortgagees to lengthen their documents by adding previously 
unnecessary provisions specifying all nonperformance as a default. Sim-
ilarly, the benefit of including rents as an automatic part of the security 
is offset by new provisions requiring new forms of rent clauses to be 
incorporated into mortgages in order to acquire any meaningful access 
to the rents.21S7 This requirement means that the parties must continue 
bargaining over wording in much the same way as they currently nego-
tiate over rents and profits clauses in important cases. Therefore, in 
both default and rent situations, we may expect to find as much boiler-
plate258 as before and to see both sides still forced to incur significant 
costs for legal advice due to the complexities of the issues. Practitioners 
may find the new rules as to default and rent more elusive and difficult 
to comprehend than the old ones. 
B. Fairness 
ULSIA regrades the playing field for two important parties. We 
are likely to hear complaints from homeowner groups over "arbitrari-
ness" in giving purchasers of four-unit residential properties complete 
256. I do not propose in this Article to write my own version of a uniform mortgage act. I also 
, have attempted to avoid criticisms based on mere policy disagreements with substantive rules, 
especially where reasonable minds can readily differ. Rather, my criticisms are more procedural or 
adjectival-the kind a technician levels against an early draft of a proposed new law in order that 
the policy makers may more directly treat the substantive concerns raised by it. Regrettably, this 
approach may make these inclusions appear too shallow and too negative at the same time. 
257. New mortgages will also need to contain possession clauses to make ULSIA's possession 
rights meaningful. Also, new mortgages should include clauses dealing with other income gener-
ated by the property, in light of the fact that they are given different status than rents. 
258. The power-of-sale system is also somewhat subject to the same criticism. On the one 
hand, it requires a mortgage to contain a power-of-sale clause, which should be unnecessary; on 
the other hand, it does not require further special enabling language for a negotiated private sale, 
which probably should always require the mortgagor's express consent. 
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deficiency protection while Jenying any protection to single-family 
homeowners who encumbered their properties to pay medical bills or 
their children's tuition before the recession cost them their jobs. We are 
especially likely to hear such complaints when houses are sold at pri-
vate non-auction sales for much less than they were worth-as well as 
for less than the balance of the mortgages-because there were no stat-
utory safeguards against such harsh results. The ULSIA tradeoff of 
complete deficiency protection in some situations for no protection 
whatsoever in other situations is not a compromise for those who own 
only one kind of property. 
Parties dealing in second mortgages are also likely to object on 
fairness grounds because the Act makes them too dependent on the 
good faith of senior creditors with regard to delinquent and potentially 
delinquent loans. That they are not entitled to receive notice of acceler-
ation nor notice of intention to foreclose, nor even notice of sale,2Cl9 may 
put them at extreme risk. This risk is compounded because such bor-
rowers cannot keep themselves independently informed by reading the 
newspapers or checking the records,260 and made more insulting be-
cause tenants can demand those same notices. Clearly these side effects 
of ULSIA will not make this system an attractive one to junior 
creditors.261 
C. Technical Difficulties 
At a lower level, many of the particular proposals contained in 
ULSIA might be improved by corrections of a more mechanical 
nature. 
1. Notices 
The new notices prescribed are covered somewhat haphazardly: no 
details are given as to the notice of acceleration, almost too many de-
tails are given for the notice of intention to foreclose, some but not 
enough are given for the notice of sale, and readers are left in doubt as 
to whether there is a fourth notice of judicial foreclosure. All such no-
259. Notice need be given only to juniors of record seven weeks before the foreclosure sale 
(which may be scheduled to occur in only five weeks). 
260. The difficulty for juniors is further compounded by the fact that they are not p~nnitted 
to cure defaults and de-acceleratc accelcrated loans. 
261. Whether other parties involved, such as guarantors, will ha\'c similar objections cannot 
be predicted, because ULSIA says so littlc about them. But that fact alone should make the 
proposed Act unsatisfactory to thosc parties so long as their rights and liabilities are enumerated 
.so vaguely. 
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tices are sensible components in a revised foreclosure system, but they 
would be better understood if each was described in comparable statu-
tory terms as to timing, content and distribution. Statutory forms 
would also help. Additionally, each notice appears to have been con-
ceived without much regard for the other notices; the Act would profit 
if more thought were devoted to reconciling and coordinating the no-
tices with each other282 and with the other substantive provisions of the 
Act.283 
2. Foreclosure Sales 
The universal acceptance of a power-of-sale foreclosure process 
would be a great achievement for ULSIA-significant enough by itself 
to outweigh all other improvements ULSIA might offer. However, the 
Act may include too few details as to the conduct of such sales for 
those inexperienced with them. And by demanding reasonableness in-
stead of offering specificity, it may frighten mortgagees away from 
utilizing this new device.284 By extending nonjudicial public auction 
sales into private negotiated sales as a method of foreclosure, the Act 
may invite the resistance of consumer protection groups for creating a 
procedure too susceptible to abuse. Reformers may also complain that 
nonjudicial foreclosure sales as proposed contain few innovations likely 
to eliminate the underbidding that so frequently accompanies distress 
sales. So long as the rules of law effectively limit foreclosure bidding to 
the creditor and to a few sophisticated insiders, sale prices are not 
likely to approach market values or preserve mortgagors' and junior 
creditors' equities in their properties. 
3. Rents and Leases 
The collection of rents from tenants without the mediation of re-
ceivers, and the survival of residential leases, are praiseworthy innova-
tions by ULSIA, addressing widely perceived problems in the foreclo-
262. One example would be how the grace period in the notice of acceleration meshes with the 
provisions of the notice of intention to foreclose. 
263. Examples include: how the notice of sale should describe a negotiated private foreclosure 
sale, and how the cure rights stated in the notice of intention to foreclose match up with the cure 
rights specified in § 513. Rights to cure also need reconsideration in terms of creating a workable 
priority system, assuming one is really desired. 
264. Mere statutory authorization of a power-of-sale foreclosure is not enough to guarantee 
widespread public acceptance. New York has permitted nonjudicial foreclosure by advertisement 
for years, but the technique has nevertheless failed to impress lenders as a satisfactory alternative 
to the judicial process. 
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sure process. The appeal of both concepts would be improved by 
additional elaboration. If the drafters of ULSIA wish to encourage 
mortgagees to more readily take possession themselves rather than seek 
the appointment of receivers, they need to give the same attention to 
the mechanics of getting possession as they have given to conduct after 
possesion has been obtained. Local ejectment proceedings generally 
take far too long, and local summary-dispossession statutes may well 
not cover the relief that ULSIA intends in this context.2011 The 
mandatory survival of both residential leases after foreclosure and all 
(junior) leases until foreclosure is adequately covered, but leaves open 
the question of whether and how junior nonresidential leases may be 
preserved after sale, especially after a nonjudicial sale. Rules governing 
these matters would better originate from ULSIA's authors than from 
individual legislators in fifty states. 
D. Other Topics Deserving Coverage in ULSIA 
Since 1975, when ULSIA's predecessor, the Uniform Land Trans-
actions Act, was drafted, we have witnessed three developments that 
have had a dramatic impact on conventional mortgage law and which 
deserve some treatment in ULSIA. 
First, the secondary market and uniform forms and covenants in 
FNMA/FHLMC instruments have marched into the field. ULSIA's 
Commissioners noted this development,266 but none of the sections of 
the Act make any reference to it.267 At the least, ULSIA's commentary 
should inform readers and users of the overlap and, if any, inconsis-
tency between its approach and that taken in the covenants. 
Second, environmental protection has significantly affected real 
estate lending, with state and federal laws threatening to impose clean-
up liability upon mortgagees who acquire their mortgagors' properties 
on foreclosure, or too heavily control their mortgagors' activities, or 
265. The Act might also more fully address the use of rents to pay property exp:nses, which 
now appears to depend on whether the rents are acquired pursuant to a rents clause or by \irtue of 
taking possession of the property. The Act should also deal with the question of disposition of 
surplus rents, which appears to be unworkable as presently described. 
266. See ULSIA prefatory note at 6 (1985). Although, as noted, the new FNMA/FHLMC 
note does describe nonpayment as a default (as ULSIA requires as a precondition to relieO, the 
uniform mortgage and deed of trust forms contain provisions regarding notices, condemnation 
proceeds, and acceleration and de-acceleration which may be at odds with the pnwisions of 
ULSIA and thus warrant investigation. 
267. This omission is not necessarily a defect, however, because tbe standardized form defers 
to local law, except where there is overriding federal law. See BURKE, supra note 16, § 1.3 (mort-
gage provision number 15); id. at 208-10 (same). 
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merely hold mortgages on contaminated real estate. Current uncer-
tainty as to these questions may be the single most important impedi-
ment to real estate lending and certainly warrants statutory treatment. 
A state mortgage statute, even a uniform one, may not be capable of 
overriding adverse federal environmental law, but there are numerous 
subsidiary issues relating to the loan itself-once it is discovered that 
the collateral consists of contaminated property-that warrant state 
mortgage legislation.268 
Third, bankruptcy law has intruded far more into mortgage lend-
ing than it did when ULTA was first promulgated. Mortgage attorneys 
pay constant attention to the Bankruptcy Code of 1978 and jupicial 
decisions applying it to secured lending. ULSIA offers a response to the 
problem of foreclosure sales being treated as fraudulent conveyances, 
but this is only one of numerous impacts that bankruptcy has on mort-
gage lending. Issues relating to the automatic stay, adequate protec-
tion, cram-downs and preferences all may be affected by appropriate 
state legislation.269 
There are at least three other areas of modern mortgage law which 
. ULSIA ignores, though parties to mortgages dare not. First, notwith-
standing the increasing use of arbitration clauses and the growing im-
portance of the Federal Arbitration Act,270 there is no reference to ar-
bitration or how it would fit within a mortgage foreclosure system.271 
Second, there are no provisions governing guarantors, telling us how 
their rights and liabilities are affected by the substantive rules of 
ULSIA.272 Third, there is nothing in the Act governing choice of law 
clauses, an omission rather astonishing in a statute drafted to facilitate 
interstate lending.273 
268. See, for example, California's new response to environmental indemnity agreements in 
CAL. CIY. PRoe. CODE § 736 (West Supp. 1992). 
269. See Krasnowiecki, supra note 137. 
270. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1988). 
271. For instance, would arbitrators have the authority to order and/or vacate foreclosure 
sales? Would arbitration awards be binding on junior Iienors who were not parties to the arbitra-
tion agreement? 
272. Guarantors can be viewed as both debtors and creditors. As mortgage debtors, ULSIA 
ignores them by not providing for them to receive notices, assert cure rights, attack imperfect 
sales, or assert deficiency protections. As creditors (seeking to recover indemnification from their 
original mortgagors after having been forced to pay the debt), ULSIA again gives them no 
guidance. 
273. Even if ULSIA were enacted immediately throughout the entire United States, there 
would still be ancillary and subsidiary questions requiring resolution under local law and justifying 
treatment in both mortgage documents and mortgage statutes whenever either the security or the 
parties have multistate contacts. 
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Other important matters are covered by ULSIA, but with less par-
ticularity than they warrant. The attention to detail that the Commis-
sioners lavished upon the mortgagee in possession provisions in the Act 
should serve as a model for the other improvements they propose for 
the collection process. Instead of simply providing that judicial foreclo-
sure is to be governed by state civil procedure law, or that all aspects of 
private sale foreclosures must be reasonable, ULSIA itself should fur-
nish all of the necessary details for those proceedings. As has been pre-
viously observed,274 incorporation of existing state judicial procedures 
will serve to retain the worst features of the existing process in many 
jurisdictions, and an undefined standard of reasonableness will signifi-
cantly reduce the attraction of the power-of-sale for detail-preferring, 
risk-averse lenders. As to these matters, far too little information is 
given to lenders or borrowers to permit them to determine whether 
ULSIA presents an attractive alternative to the existing rules in their 
jurisdiction.2715 
Additional material topics might also be so enriched. The proceed-
_ing for obtaining a deficiency judgment after a nonjudicial foreclosure 
274. See discussion supra part VII. 
275. There is probably a natural temptation on the part of attorneys in judicial-foreclosure 
states to prefer that their statutes be broad and general, setting forth b:lSie policies rather than 
trivial,details. But such a statutory system works well only when the regulated transactions occur 
in court (e.g. judicial foreclosures) where all contested, lesser questions can be resolved promptly 
through judicial supervision without significantly impeding the overall process. When the process 
is taken out of the courts-as nonjudicial foreclosures would be under ULSIA-those matters 
cannot so easily be ignored because the consequences of error dramatically change. 
For instance, if in a judicial foreclosure proceeding the mortgagor believes that the mortgagee 
should sell in parcels or in bulk, it is easy enough to get a ruling on that question ahead of time 
from the judge ordering the sale. Win or lose, the mortgagee can then go ahead \~ith the sale as 
judicially prescribed. But if the foreclosure is out of the court and the same disagreement arises, 
how it is resolved? The mortgagor may go to court before the sale, assuming there is time, to 
enjoin what it sees as an impropriety, but that is improbable. More likely. the mortgagee \\ill 
decide to go ahead with the sale as planned, ignoring the mortgagor's complaint, or else revise it 
to appease the mortgagor. Appeasement means that the mortgagor controls the sale, but rejection 
means that a court may, after the sale is over, decide that the mortgagor was right and nullify the 
sale. That is a high risk to run, not only for the mortgagee, but for any potential bidder at the sale 
listening to the mortgagor complain. 
The lesson mortgagees have learned from this in nonjudicial-foreclosure jurisdictions is that 
the price to pay for elimination of the courts from the foreclosure process is extensive legislative 
guidance, resolving all the challenges which mortgagors may make. In California, for instance. the 
basic foreclosure statutes run over twelve thousand words, CAL CIV. CODE §§ 2924-2924k (West 
1974 & Supp. 1992), not counting many other statutes that also regulate this process. lenders 
want to be told by the legislature whether to make two or three copies of documents ~nsc that 
is safer than learning the answer afterwards from the judiciary. Nitpicking becomes a way of life, 
as this Article may sadly demonstrate. 
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sale is omitted entirely, although the improved power-of-sale process, 
when combined with a declining real estate market makes it likely that 
such relief will frequently be sought.276 Multiple security and questions 
of piecemeal foreclosure also receive scant attention, although they are 
of obvious importance in many commercial loans. 
E. Uniformity or Reform? 
There may be a need for more national uniformity than is now 
achieved by the Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac Uniform Covenants, but the 
greater need-with regard to state foreclosure laws-is probably for 
reform rather than for uniformity. Eastern lenders do not need to have 
foreclosure rules in other states consistent with those in their home 
states so much as they need to have a workable foreclosure process 
available in the states where they place their funds, even if the process 
differs from that at home. Most significantly, lenders probably want a 
power-of-sale foreclosure alternative available everywhere, whether or 
not the steps to be followed vary from state to state. The earlier politi-
cal motivation that led to the division of ULTA into smaller pieces 
might effectively be carried on even further, down perhaps to a model 
power-of-sale foreclosure act, which creates a uniform structure, com-
prehensible to all, even though particulars such as dates and places 
could vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.277 
F. Architecture 
Working with ULSIA is often frustrating. Rules dealing with one 
issue appear in a section ostensibly relating to another issue, sending 
the user on searches back and forth across the Act for the appropriate 
provisions. Provisions governing the same topic often switch vocabulary, 
forcing readers to guess whether real differences are intended, or 
merely whether no staff person ever attempted to consolidate the vary-
ing texts and revisions submitted by different proponents into a single, 
cohesive form. The commentary is often at odds with the text, permit-
ting rival and conflicting interpretations. And frequently there are 
gaps, ambiguities, and inconsistencies among and between the provi-
276. Also excluded is a statutory explanation or guide to· the consequences of taking a money 
judgment before foreclosure without having it refer to the mortgage. Section 501 (b), therefore, 
provides only half a rule. 
277. In addition to criticizing ULSIA for the omissions already noted, the Act also attempts 
to cover an enormous range of issues; a narrower but more thorough act might be easier for all to 
accept at this time. 
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sions themselves. This is not an attractively presented act generating 
any emotional inclination to support it. Too often, I fear that the slogan 
will become "ULSIA? NIMBY!" 
